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These are no times of ordinary politics. These are formative hours: the national purpose 
and thought grows and ripens in thirty days as much as ordinary years bring it forward. 
Wendell Phillips, 1866 
We were moving slowly in an absolutely impossible direction. 
W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America: 1860-1880 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the racial ideologies of four newspapers in New Orleans at 
the beginning and end of Radical Reconstruction: the Daily Picayune, the New Orleans 
Republican, the New Orleans Tribune, and the Weekly Louisianian. It explores how each 
paper understood the issues of racial equality, integration, suffrage, and black humanity; 
it examines the specific language and rhetoric each paper used to advocate for their 
positions; and it asks how those positions changed from the beginning to the end of 
Reconstruction. The study finds that the two white-owned papers, the Picayune and the 
Republican, while political opponents, both viewed racial equality as primarily a political 
consideration that could be either advocated for or cautioned against depending on 
circumstance. On the other hand, the black-owned papers, the Tribune and the 
Louisianian, understood race as the essential issue of Reconstruction and equality for the 
black population as a moral imperative tied closely to fundamental American values.  
This contrast in rhetoric illustrates a critical divide between the black and white elements 
of the Republican party in Louisiana during the era, and helps explain the ultimate failure 
of Reconstruction’s efforts to bring racial equality to the state. 
		 1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“It is clear from the time of Washington and Jefferson down to the Civil War,” 
argued W.E.B DuBois in his history of Reconstruction, “when the nation was asked if it 
was possible for free Negroes to become American citizens in the full sense of the word, 
it answered by a stern and determined ‘No!’” (1935, 132). Before the Civil War, even 
those who opposed slavery had trouble conceiving of the full integration of slaves into 
society once it ended. Abraham Lincoln was a proponent of colonizing blacks in other 
parts of the world rather than attempting to sort out the implications of their freedom if 
they were to remain in America. “What next?” he asked during his campaign in 1860. 
“Free them and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feeling will not 
admit of this, and if mine would, we well know that those of the great mass of whites will 
not” (DuBois 1935, 146).  
But the events of the war, particularly emancipation and the participation of black 
soldiers in the Union Army, made political equality for former slaves a real possibility. 
“At last the same necessity which insisted first upon emancipation and then upon the 
arming of the slaves, insists with the same unanswerable force upon the admission to 
complete Equality before the law,” argued Charles Sumner, “so that there shall be no ban 
of color in the court-room or in the ballot-box, and government shall be fixed on its only 
rightful foundation—the consent of the governed” (1876, 129). By 1864, Lincoln was 
suggesting at least partial suffrage in Louisiana for the black soldiers who had fought 
with the Union. Indeed, the integration of black people into American democracy became 
a central issue for the nation, and forced it to grapple with the underlying problem of 
slavery since the founding. “The true significance of slavery in the United States to the 
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whole social development of America lay in the ultimate relation of slaves to 
democracy,” argued DuBois. 
What were to be the limits of democratic control in the United States? If all labor, 
black as well as white, became free— were given schools and the right to vote— 
what control could or should be set to the power and action of these laborers? 
Was the rule of the mass of Americans to be unlimited, and the right to rule 
extended to all men regardless of race and color, or if not, what power of 
dictatorship and control; and how much would property and privilege be 
protected? This was the great and primary question which was in the minds of the 
men who wrote the Constitution of the United States and continued in the minds 
of thinkers down through the slavery controversy. It still remains with the world 
as the problem of democracy expands and touches all races and nations. (1935,13) 
 
 The war did not bring everyone to such magnanimous conclusions toward the freed 
slaves as it did Sumner. In the South, many had dark and dramatic visions of what 
emancipation might mean for the freed slaves and for society as a whole. The 
possibilities for black people, they thought, were limited to their extinction or reversion 
into a system more or less indistinguishable from slavery. To the extent they believed that 
black people possessed the capability to become effective citizens, “this would in itself be 
the worst conceivable thing on earth; worse than shiftless, unprofitable labor; worse than 
ignorance, worse than crime. It would lead inevitably to a mulatto South and the eventual 
ruin of all civilization” (DuBois 1935, 130).  
 Even for those who advocated for black suffrage and equal rights, what drove their 
advocacy were often political and economic calculations rather than moral imperatives or 
a commitment to the principles of democracy. Northern business leaders and  
Republicans who did not necessarily believe in the principles of racial equality needed 
Black suffrage in the South in order to prevent a full scale revitalization of the 
Confederate state governments that had seceded just years before. C. Vann Woodward 
calls this “the incubus with which the Negro was burdened before he was ever awakened 
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into political life”: 
The operative and effective motives of his political genesis were extraneous to his 
own interests and calculated to serve other ends. If there ever came a time when 
those ends—party advantage and sectional business interests—were better served 
in some other way, even in a way destructive to the basic political rights of the 
race, then the political prospects of the Negro would darken. (1957, 235) 
 
Even the black elite who had been free before the war petitioned for their own suffrage 
before deciding it would be in their interest to work on behalf of the freed slaves as well 
(Tunnell 1984, 78).  
 These competing and occasionally contradictory aspirations for the integration of 
black people into society help explain the political developments of Reconstruction and 
the ultimate demise of Republican governance in the South. One way those aspirations 
were articulated to the public was through local newspapers. This thesis looks at the 
coverage of four newspapers in New Orleans near the beginning and end of Radical 
Reconstruction. It focuses on each paper’s views on race, what language and rhetoric was 
used to articulate those views, and how those views changed from the start to the end of 
Reconstruction. New Orleans, home to the first black-owned daily, provides a unique 
setting to understand how papers with differing racial and political ideologies engaged 
with the extraordinary circumstances of the period. 
 
Louisiana’s Reconstruction 
 New Orleans fell to the Union army in 1862, ushering in an era of Reconstruction 
that at times grew “more tangled than the region’s labyrinth of swamps and bayous” 
(Tunnell 1864, 2).  Louisiana, in particular New Orleans, was an outlier in terms of its 
racial and social composition before the war.  There were nearly 19,000 free blacks in 
		 4 
Louisiana in 1860, owning fifteen million dollars worth of property, which included 
slaves. In addition, they had a record of military service. In 1815, a free black militia 
fought in the Battle of New Orleans under Andrew Jackson. Before that, in 1811, they 
had volunteered to help put down a violent slave rebellion. (Tunnell 1864, 67-68). This 
position of the black elite in Louisiana created a unique political environment at the 
beginning of Reconstruction. The New Orleans Tribune described the situation in 1864: 
Louisiana is in a very peculiar situation. Here, the colored population has a 
twofold origin. There is an old population, with a history and mementos of their 
own, warmed by patriotism and partaking of the feelings and education of the 
white. The only social condition known to these men is that of freedom….There 
is, on the other hand, a population of freedmen, but recently liberated from the 
shackles of bondage. All is to be done yet for them. (December 27, 1864) 
 
The presence of the already free black population forced the state to deal with the 
question of black suffrage during the wartime Reconstruction policies under Lincoln, and 
perhaps even forced it upon the nation.  In 1863, the free blacks of Louisiana petitioned  
wartime Governor George F. Shepley to be allowed to register to vote. They were denied. 
In 1864 they established the Louisiana National Equal Rights League and formed the 
New Orleans Tribune, and two representatives of the free black community met with 
President Lincoln in Washington to attempt to persuade him to endorse black suffrage 
(Tunnell 1984, 77-78, Foner 2014, 49). Lincoln, after the meeting, in a private letter to 
then Governor Michael Hahn, lightly encouraged the idea of allowing black delegates at 
the upcoming constitutional convention: “I barely suggest for your consideration, 
whether some of the colored people not be let in—as for instance, the very intelligent, 
and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks… But this is only a 
suggestion, not to the public but to you alone” (qtd. in Foner 2014, 49). The early 
pressure for even limited black suffrage during wartime Reconstruction in Louisiana was 
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important in opening up the possibility for the nation as a whole. “If this experiment in 
Reconstruction had been attempted anywhere but in Louisiana, it is possible that the 
whole question of Negro suffrage would not have been raised then, or perhaps for many 
years after,” argued Dubois (1935, 153).  
 But it would have to wait. The constitutional convention of 1864, consisting of 
white Unionists, produced a constitution that abolished slavery but went no further in 
granting political rights to the black population (Taylor 1974, 50-52). Even among 
Unionists, black political equality was strongly opposed by more conservative factions.  
Historian Ted Tunnell cites fear as the primary difference between the outlook of Radical 
Unionists to that of the conservatives: “Underlying the hatred and recalcitrance of 
conservatives and reactionaries was fear, fear of race war, of Negro equality, of this 
bogey or that; fear, above all, that amalgamation would subvert their sense of themselves 
as Christian men, living in a civilized culture.” For Radicals, however, the fear was 
absent. This was not necessarily due to a belief in the viability of a post-racial society. 
For some it had more to do with their total confidence in white supremacy. Alfred C. 
Hill, who served as an aide to General Nathaniel P. Banks and was considered a Radical, 
claimed he did not fear racially equality “because I believe that the white race is the 
dominant race in this country, and always will be” (Tunnell 1984, 63).    
 In 1867, however, following a resurgence of reactionary policies and former rebels 
being given political positions under President Johnson’s Reconstruction plan, there was 
an attempt to convene another statewide constitutional convention in New Orleans. The 
convention would have enfranchised blacks and stripped the vote from former 
Confederates. However, a group of armed whites (aided by the local police force) 
		 6 
responded by massacring blacks and convention delegates (Tunnell 1984, 105-106). The 
event had national impact. The extent of the targeted violence undermined Johnson’s 
conservative plan that had allowed many rebels to return to power in Louisiana. Among a 
host of other factors, it provided the foundation for a push in the United States Congress 
for Radical Reconstruction in the South, which eventually led to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, the 14th Amendment, and the Reconstruction Act. The impeachment 
of Johnson, his narrow escape from being removed from office, and the election of 
Ulysses S. Grant in 1868 followed soon after. The rights—whether civil, political, or 
social-- of the four million slaves freed during abolition were being vigorously debated 
and rapidly defined on a national stage (Foner 2014, 263-280). 
 In accordance with the Reconstruction Act, in order for Southern states to be 
readmitted, they were required to convene a constitutional convention that would 
guarantee black suffrage and  ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. The delegates of these 
conventions were elected by loyal Unionist whites and blacks, with voter registration and 
elections overseen by the military commander assigned to the specific district. In 
Louisiana, it produced a diverse crowd, unlike any other governing body in the state 
before it: 
The members were an extraordinary group: blacks and whites; ex-slaves and ex-
slave owners (of both colors); Northerners and Southerners; Protestants and 
Catholics; elder statesmen and young men barely old enough to vote; famous men 
and obscure men, some from the Confederate South’s only metropolis and others 
from its most isolated rural areas; men of wealth and men who never before or 
ever again after would earn as much as the state paid them for attending the 
convention. By occupation they were clerks, shop owners, grocers, planters, 
farmers, lawyers, judges, journalists, doctors, politicians, tradesmen, and jack-of-
all-trades. Yet, for all their diversity, they shared common bonds: loyalty to the 
Union, membership in the Radical Republican party, and a similar view of recent 
history. (Tunnell 1984, 113) 
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The majority of delegates at the convention were black, and the resulting constitution not 
only enfranchised blacks, it contained the first Bill of Rights for Louisiana, guaranteed 
“public rights” in addition to civil and political, and even mandated that at least one 
public school be built in each parish in Louisiana. Segregation in public schools was to be 
prohibited (Tunnell 1984, 111-135). 
This thesis begins its investigation following the convention, with the presidential 
election that took place in November of 1868. In the preceding months, beginning with 
the gubernatorial election in April, Louisiana saw itself submerged in a steady campaign 
of political violence. Secret paramilitary societies began to meet in order to organize 
against the policies of Radical Reconstruction and using intimidation tactics to drive 
Republicans from the polls. In 1868 alone, the terrorist organizations killed 784 people 
and wounded 450 more, primarily black Republicans (Dauphine 1989, 176).   
The following years of attempted Reconstruction saw the Republican Party, led 
primarily by Northern politicians known as “carpetbaggers,” faced with a crisis of 
legitimacy, crippling party infighting, and political violence. On one hand, the Governor, 
Henry Clay Warmoth, pursued a strategy of reconciliation with former rebels, hoping to 
win white voters. He extended patronage to white conservatives by appointing them to 
state and local offices, as well as the bench. Despite being from Illinois, he played up his 
Southern roots, and repealed the disenfranchisement clause of the Radical constitution 
that prevented some Rebels from voting. In addition, he refused to implement many of 
the civil rights provisions from the constitution— vetoing legislation that would enforce 
the prevention of discrimination in public spaces, and refusing to desegregate rural 
schools or the Louisiana State Seminary. Warmoth’s appeals to the white vote, however, 
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drew antagonism from the more Radical portion of his own party, particularly the black 
members (Tunnell 1984, 151-172).  
Warmoth also attempted to maintain power through more forceful methods. To 
wrestle control in the heavily Democratic countryside, Republicans created new parishes 
and appointed their own officials to head them. They used a similar tactic in New 
Orleans, which allowed the Governor to appoint city officials and maintain Republican 
control of the city between 1870 and 1872 for the only time during Reconstruction. In 
addition, they implemented a Returning Board that was responsible for counting the votes 
and was able to discard the vote tallies from precincts where violence or intimidation had 
occurred. These tactics, however, created problems for the Republicans as well by 
undermining the very legitimacy of the democracy they were hoping to instill: “To 
protect themselves from those who would destroy them with violence, they constructed a 
police and election apparatus the internal logic of which subverted the democratic 
government as surely as the tactics of their opponents” (Tunnell 1984, 160). 
The contradictions of these political strategies led to the tumultuous election of 
1872, in which the Republican Party abandoned Warmoth and ran William P. Kellogg 
against a Fusionist party made up of Democrats and the Warmoth Republicans. The 
Returning Board split into two, and both parties claimed victory (Taylor 1974, 227-242).  
President Grant had to step in to declare Kellogg the Governor. By that time, however, 
Kellogg “would rule the corpse of a Republican Louisiana” (Tunnell 1984, 172). The 
increased perception of illegitimacy after the election, alongside the economic depression 
that swept the nation, led to the rise of the White League and a wave of violence in 
Louisiana that overthrew the Republican governments in several rural parishes. In 1874, 
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the Colfax massacre left over 100 black Republicans dead (Tunnell 1984, 189). The same 
year, the White League attempted to take control of the legislature by force, necessitating 
an intervention by federal troops (Taylor 1974, 293). Nationally, following  the Panic of 
1873 and the subsequent economic depression, the electorate in the North took a sharp 
turn away from the Republican Party. In the1874 national Congressional elections, 
Republicans lost the large majority in the House that they had enjoyed since the 
beginning of the war. Finally, in 1877, an agreement in the United States Congress over 
the disputed presidential election of 1876 secured Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency, 
dictated the removal of federal troops from the South, and ended Reconstruction (Foner 
2014, 523; Morris Jr, 2003). 
 
The Southern Press During Reconstruction 
This thesis looks at three ideological categories of newspapers during 
Reconstruction: a white-owned Democratic paper, and both a black- and a white-owned 
Republican paper. The New Orleans Picayune is the Democratic paper and the New 
Orleans Republican is the white-owned Republican paper. Because there was no single 
black-owned newspaper that spanned the entirety of Reconstruction, this thesis looks at 
two: the New Orleans Tribune which was first published in 1864 and ran until 1868, and 
the Weekly Louisianian, which was founded in 1870 and ran until 1882. The Daily 
Picayune is a product of the antebellum Southern press, while the New Orleans 
Republican, the Tribune, and the Louisianian each were founded following the Unionist 
takeover of New Orleans.  
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During the second half of the 18th century, the Southern press tended to be an 
ideologically cohesive force in terms of race, and strongly resistant to dissenting voices. 
The ideology, in its most simple terms, was white supremacy. While the shades of this 
thinking varied to a degree, between a paternalistic attitude insisting black people should 
occupy the lower rungs of society, to a flat out desire for extermination, or later  a 
pseudo-scientific notion of racial order called Volksgeist—none seriously threatened the 
race-based economic and social structures of the South (Cummings 2003, 79-86). During 
Reconstruction, this force of opinion devoted itself to maintaining the antebellum racial 
order and vehemently opposing any attempt at Radical reform. “Perhaps in no other time 
in American history has any significant part of the press so blindly devoted itself to a 
political campaign for so lengthy a period,” argues Carl R. Osthaus  in Partisans of the 
Southern Press (1994, 124). Osthaus takes the career of John Forsyth of the Mobile Daily 
Register as a representation of how Southern editors behaved during Reconstruction.  In 
the Register, Republicans received a torrent of insults and were portrayed as tyrannical 
leaders, actively exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy that many Republican governments 
were facing.  On the question of race, Forsyth treated blacks with contempt. He 
denounced their participation in politics and entrance into the public school system, gave 
sensationalized accounts of black violence, and stirred up white fear of a race war. While 
other editors may have varied in their styles and tactics, Othaus argues, the views 
expressed by Forsyth were shared by Democratic editors across the South (1994, 118-
148). 
Richard H. Abbott’s For Free Press and Equal Rights (2004) provides the most 
comprehensive overview of the Republican press during Reconstruction, both in terms of 
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organization and ideology. As a new institution in the South, he describes the distinct 
challenge that the Republican papers faced: 
The South’s Republican editors had to balance two sometimes conflicting 
concerns that reflected the dilemma facing their party in the ex-Confederate 
States. On the one hand, they wanted to establish their party and its press as 
legitimate institutions entitled to share in their section’s political life. At the same 
time, these editors hoped to build a viable political constituency among voters, 
both black and white. Since the bulk of Republican support came from 
freedmen’s votes, Republican editors’ efforts to rally black support made it 
exceedingly challenging to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of whites. (95) 
 
Abbott describes an effort of editors to create a counter-part, both ideologically and 
stylistically, to the dominant Democratic press. Republican papers were aggressive 
advocates of free speech, “adopted a calm and objective editorial tone,” and made efforts 
to modernize what they saw as the backwards thinking South. In addition, they advocated 
for equal political and civil rights for freed slaves. On this point, however, editors had to 
make efforts to do so in a way that did not completely alienate the white voters that they 
were hoping to attract. They were primarily aimed towards a white readership, and rarely 
challenged the assumption of inherent white supremacy. Instead, they attempted to 
assuage white fears of a race war, the indolence of free black laborers, and the threat of 
Republican governments to confiscate land, integrate schools, and disenfranchise white 
voters (Abbott 2004, 95-115). 
The Republican papers faced significant challenges beyond negotiating their 
ideological position. With many Conservative businessmen refusing to buy advertising or 
provide patronage, they found it difficult to maintain the financial backing necessary for 
survival. One solution the party turned to was funding the press through the state 
treasury. In Louisiana, this meant $1.5 million of state funds going to public printing in 
the first three years of Republican rule. This patronage could only go so far, however. 
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Republican papers rarely had the funds to subscribe to AP services, which left them at a 
significant disadvantage to Democratic papers that could provide more extensive 
coverage. In addition, news that was sent North was regularly altered and censored by 
conservative telegraph operators, or written by AP correspondents in the South who were 
Democrats themselves. This allowed for only a single, distorted picture of what was 
happening in the South to reach Northern readers and lawmakers, and “affected not only 
the credibility but the stability of Southern governments” (Summers 1994, 220-223). 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 115 black newspapers were founded in 
the United States. While most had a relatively short life span, lasting only around eight 
years, at least nine survived to the turn of the century (Simmons 1995, 15). There were 
five black papers in Louisiana during Reconstruction, but the Tribune and the 
Louisianian were the only papers that lasted more than a few years. Before the war there 
had been just 25 black papers in the United States in total (Hutton 1995, 6). The Southern 
black papers struggled after the war with many of the same issues as the Republican press 
at large, but they also emerged from a distinct tradition. With the founding of the first 
black paper, the Freedom’s Journal in 1827, the primary goal of the black press was to 
establish a legitimate voice for the free black population that had been fundamentally 
ignored and degraded by the white press, and provide an alternative vision of black 
humanity (Simmons 1995, 10). In addition, many of these editors advocated for the 
abolition of slavery and the extension of democratic rights to free blacks. As Frankie 
Hutton suggests, a driving ideological force in the development of the black press were 
the ideals of the American Revolution. That democratic idealism, she argues, continued 
to shape the black press after the Civil War and throughout Reconstruction (1995, 7-9). 
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The evidence gathered from both of the black papers examined in this study support her 
contention.  
“The conviction of nineteenth-century newspaper editors that they substantially 
influenced public opinion proves difficult to evaluate,” Abbott concedes (2004, 1). 
However, because the South lacked the host of opportunities for acquiring information 
that the North provided (magazines, publishing houses, libraries and public schools), 
newspapers played an oversized role in educating the masses. In a time as contentious as 
Reconstruction, with so much on the line for so many, that role was likely inflated again.  
 
The New Orleans Daily Picayune 
The New Orleans Picayune debuted in late January 1837. Its founders and 
original editors, Francis Asbury Lumsden of North Carolina and George Wilkins Kendall 
of Vermont, consciously modeled the paper after the penny presses of the Northeast—
something that had yet to be done in the South. Initially light-hearted and aiming to 
entertain, the Picayune evolved into an “establishment press,” with an interest in 
influencing public affairs. Before the election of Lincoln, it was Unionist and attempted 
to resist the calls of Radicals from both the North and the South. Lincoln’s election, 
however, “forced it into a pragmatic acceptance of secession.”  By 1860, with a 
circulation of 12,600, it had become the largest paper in the South. (Osthaus 1994, 47-
68).     
Despite two brief shutdowns during the Union occupation, after the war the 
Picayune emerged in “a stronger position than that of any other New Orleans newspaper” 
(Copeland 1947, 109). It was still, however, considerably shrunk. According to a Geo P. 
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Rowell and Co’s 1869 American Newspaper Directory for advertisers, the circulation 
was somewhere between five and ten thousand.  
Edited by Alva Morris Holbrook, with a brief disruption in 1872, the paper 
focused primarily on economic and agricultural concerns—though by no means ignored 
politics. While Holbrook determined the overall direction of the paper, the “brilliant 
commentaries on the political situation” of the early Reconstruction years came from 
Connecticut-born Samuel F. Wilson. Other influential editors included Joseph A. 
Quintero and Marion A. Baker. With Holbrook’s death in 1876, his wife took over as 
publisher, and led the paper during the election of 1876 (Copeland 1947, 110-114). 
Throughout Reconstruction, the Picayune maintained a relatively sober tone compared to 
other Southern publications. “The Picayune,” argued Osthaus, “though a critic of Radical 
Rule and social change in the postwar South, avoided the bitter-end resistance so 
destructive of effective journalism, and thus became the only antebellum, English-
language paper in New Orleans to survive the war and Reconstruction.”  Merging with 
the Times-Democrat in 1914 and forming the Times-Picayune, it continues as one of the 
dominant New Orleans newspapers (Osthaus 1994, 68). 
 
The New Orleans Republican 
The New Orleans Republican was founded in March of 1867 and declared itself 
in its prospectus “devoted to the Political, Commercial, and Industrial interests of 
Louisiana; in furtherance of which it will support the Republican Party, and the policy of 
Reconstruction adopted by Congress.” General Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks,  
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who were commanding the federal troops in New Orleans at the time, signed a letter 
vouching for the loyalty of the papers proprietors, S.L. Brown & Company.  
The paper soon came under the editorship of Michael Hahn, who had served as a 
military Governor in Louisiana between 1864 and 1865 and was both a member of the 
school board and the state legislature throughout Reconstruction (Reeves 1962, 71). With 
the election of Henry Clay Warmoth in 1868, the Republican picked up the official 
printing contract that had been lost by the Tribune. This was perhaps unsurprising, as 
Warmoth himself owned a considerable stake in the paper, and through the contract the 
paper “grew fat on state printing” (Taylor 1974, 157, 199).  
The Republican printed a four- or eight-page paper six days a week for 10 years.  
According to the Geo P. Rowell and Co’s 1875 directory, it had a daily circulation of 
around 1,800. After the election of 1876, however, it briefly downgraded to a weekly, 
and then a semi-weekly. On November 10, 1878 it printed its last issue. 
 
The New Orleans Tribune 
The New Orleans Tribune  was born when Dr. Louis Charles Roudanez purchased 
the printing equipment from the defunct L’Union two days after its closure in the summer 
of 1864 (Melancon 2011, 36). L’Union, a French-language paper founded five days after 
the emancipation proclamation by an all black group of shareholders, had been the first 
general circulation black paper in the South. It published bi-weekly and subsequently tri-
weekly (Simmons 1995, 14; Melancon 2011, 35). Roudanez himself had been a founder 
of L’Union. He was a free black, born in Louisiana and educated in Paris. Paul Trévigne, 
the editor of L’Union, was also a free black, born and raised in New Orleans. He joined 
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Roudanez at the Tribune as its original editor, and together they published the first issue 
on July 21, 1864 (Connor 2001, 163). By 1865, it claimed a circulation of 3,000 papers 
daily, and in 1866 boasted (dubiously, perhaps, given the reported circulation of the 
Picayune) of having a larger circulation than any other paper in New Orleans (Melancon 
2011, 52).  
L’Union had been a caste journal, focusing on the aristocratic free black 
population with little concern for the freedmen. But the Tribune made it a point to appeal 
across class divides by printing in both French and English, and advocating the common 
interests of black people in Louisiana. An important part of their effort was Jean-Charles 
Houzeau, a white, Belgian-born abolitionist, who became the editor of the Tribune in the 
months after it was founded, while Trévigne remained on as an associate editor. Houzeau, 
by placing an emphasis on the English portion of the paper and by covering political 
events, broadened the Tribune’s commitment to racial equality. He also made the Tribune 
a formidable political entity by sending copies of it to Northern papers, as well as every 
Congressman, who were then able to use his editorials to supplement their own rhetoric 
on the South. The paper obtained a printing contract from the Louisiana Republican 
Party, and in April of 1867, the Tribune was classified as the “Official Organ of the 
United States Government” (Melancon 2011, 58; Connor 2001, 163-165).  
The rest of the staff was an “extraordinary group of black, brown, and white 
workers” (Rankin 1984, 29). But none had the dedication of Houzeau, who by 1866 had 
written 1,500 articles for the paper. After the Constitutional Convention, however, 
Houzeau left the paper after splitting with Roudanez over the best strategy to pursue 
regarding the candidacy of Henry Clay Warmoth, who they both opposed for governor. 
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Roudanez wanted to nominate another ticket, while Houzeau thought that such an 
approach may hand victory to the Democrats. Feeling he had lost a degree of editorial 
confidence, Houzeau resigned his editorship and moved to Jamaica, and eventually back 
to Belgium (Connor 2001, 179). With Warmoth’s victory, both Congress and the 
Republican Party dropped their contracts with the Tribune. After a seven month printing 
hiatus, and a brief attempt to revive itself as a weekly, the Tribune printed its final issue 
in 1870 (Melancon 2001, 61). 
 
The Weekly Louisianian 
The Weekly Louisianian published its first issue on December 18, 1870, and 
began publication as a semi-weekly. The main proprietor was P.B.S. Pinchback, a free 
black man who had come to New Orleans in 1862 from Mississippi where he had been 
working as a river-boat captain. He served briefly in the Union Army, was a delegate in 
the 1868 Constitutional Convention, then a State Senator, and became the first black 
Governor of a U.S. state in 1872, when he served to replace Henry Warmoth, who was 
suspended pending the trial of his impeachment (Taylor 1974, 221-249). William G. 
Brown served as the Louisianian’s first editor until 1872 when he took over as 
Louisiana’s superintendent of education. He was succeeded by Henry A. Corbin, who 
edited the paper through the election 1876 (Chronicling America 2017).   
The paper continued in the tradition of L’Union and the Tribune in advocating for 
equal rights for blacks, and claimed that “not a single line published was written by a 
white” (Abbott 2004, 151). But it also covered a wide-range of topics, including national 
and international news, and by 1872 had a network of correspondents throughout the state 
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and country (Breaux 2006, 75). While the exact circulation numbers are not readily 
available, its listing in an advertiser’s newspaper directory throughout the 70’s suggests it 
was never greater than 5,000.  The Louisianian also made an effort to attract a white 
audience more so than other black papers in Louisiana, initially touting its Republican 
credentials over its identity as a black paper. Its masthead read: “Republican at all times 
and under all circumstances” (Breaux 2006, 70). This allegiance to the party above race, 
however, would eventually become strained--- as evidenced by the coverage examined in 
this study. 
 
Methods 
 While a number of studies provide a sense of the racial ideology and rhetoric of the 
press during Reconstruction, this thesis hopes to delve deeper. A comparative study of 
three papers operating in the same city will not only reveal their racial outlooks, but 
explore how they evolved in relation to the development of Reconstruction and adjusted 
to political circumstances. 
 This thesis will examine the coverage of each paper during two periods: one near 
the start of Radical Reconstruction, and one at the end. For the two white-owned papers, 
the Picayune and the Republican, it looks at the coverage the month surrounding the 
presidential elections of 1868 and 1876— two weeks before and two weeks after. The 
black-owned papers are more limited in their availability. I look at the closest available 
issues of the New Orleans Tribune before and after the election of 1868, which consisted 
of 18 issues from April of that year and 12 issues from December. Because there are only 
two issues of the Weekly Louisianian available during 1876, I looked at all available 
issues between the end of 1875 and the end of l877— 13 issues in total.  
		 19 
 Each paper will be analyzed with certain questions in mind. Most importantly, how 
is the fate of black people in the United States described or imagined? Are race relations 
described primarily in political, moral, or practical terms? Does each paper advocate for 
equal rights, and if so does that position stem from a professed belief in racial equality or 
from political necessity? Is the fate of black people a central element in the coverage, or 
only mentioned peripherally? How are black people described, particularly in their roles 
as citizens and lawmakers? And finally, how did these views evolve throughout 
Reconstruction? 
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Chapter Two: 1868 
So it is in the political life of a State. Today the future brightens with hope, and 
promises of peace and prosperity. Tomorrow portends disaster, and the bad 
passions of bad men threaten bloodshed and disorder. (New Orleans Republican, 
October 20, 1868) 
 
The Daily Picayune and the New Orleans Republican 
         As the election of 1868 approached, a tremendous amount of violence plagued New 
Orleans. “By day and night white mobs roamed the city and its suburbs” writes Ted 
Tunnell, “robbing, beating, and killing Negroes; breaking up Republican clubs and 
processions; and ambushing and so intimidating the police that patrolmen feared to leave 
their station houses” (1984, 154). In the two weeks before the election and those 
immediately following, both the Daily Picayune and the New Orleans Republican were 
compelled to report on the violence and advocate an appropriate response to it, but had to 
do so with a certain degree of dexterity. For the Picayune, the election of a Democratic 
president, and thus ending Radical Reconstruction before it could get off the ground, was 
an enticing prospect, and one that looked increasingly viable as elections in the North 
showed Democrats increasing in power. But as a means of securing electoral victory, the 
violence against blacks and Republicans was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
keeping Republicans from the polls through intimidation was likely the only way the 
Democrats would be able to carry the state for Horatio Seymour, the Democratic 
presidential nominee who was running against the Republican, Ulysses S. Grant. Just 
months before they had lost the battle over the ratification of the state constitution and 
control of the state legislature. On the other hand, the violence threatened to undermine 
the legitimacy of a Democratic victory. The Republican faced a more practical concern: 
should they encourage Republicans, many of them newly enfranchised freedmen who had 
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yet to participate in a national election, to go out and vote when it could mean risking 
their lives?  
 The Picayune’s reporting of the violence reflects and highlights its positions 
regarding race, politics, and democracy at the time: the fundamental denial of black 
political agency and humanity; the inherent deviousness of the carpetbaggers; the 
inevitability of constant white violence in response to black suffrage; and the 
impossibility of a functioning multi-racial democracy or integrated society. 
 The Picayune’s degradation of blacks was twofold. First, it dubiously attributed to 
them excessive and unprovoked violence. Second, it maintained that blacks were being 
unwittingly pressed to commit that violence by self-serving carpetbaggers, thus denying 
even their independence. The Picayune ran daily stories leading up to the election 
portraying the black population as violent, threatening, and hateful. This narrative, 
however, was sometimes difficult to square with the actual results of the violence. 
Georges Clemenceau, who covered Reconstruction in America for a French newspaper, 
wrote: “In all events of the kind, the remarkable feature is that according to the 
telegraphic reports, there is always a band of heavily armed negroes attacking a handfull 
[sic] of harmless whites. Then when it comes to counting the dead, a few negroes are 
always down, but of white men, not a trace” (qtd. in Taylor 1974, 168, Foner 2014). This 
was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in a single headline from the Picayune on 
October 25: 
A RIOT ON CANAL STREET 
Six Negroes Killed. 
Two Wounded Mortally. 
Terrible Excitement. 
Negroes are Again the Aggressors. 
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The insistence on blacks as the source of violence also allowed the Picayune to avoid an 
uncomfortable truth about their own relationship to political violence, which was that in 
addition to needing it as an electoral tool, the logic of their political position depended on 
it. They discouraged the violence of Democrats in the abstract, suggesting in one editorial 
that the wrongs inflicted upon them by the North could “be properly and efficiently 
remedied only by and through peaceful means” (October 22). But when it came to actual 
acts of violence committed against black people, the Picayune portrayed them as 
warranted. After a fire in Gretna, the Picayune reported: “For while the fire was at its 
height, several negroes were observed stealing and carrying away goods and any portable 
articles they could lay their hands on. This, of course, provoked the citizens and in the 
melee which immediately followed three of the negroes were killed” (October 24). Not 
only were acts of individual violence justified circumstantially, violence in general was 
considered unavoidable in the face of Republican rule. “It is our duty to counsel peace 
and forbearance,” printed the Picayune on October 30, “but it is equally our duty to say 
that Radical legislation as now going on is inimical to peace and order and the prosperity 
of the State.” 
 The New Orleans Republican made an effort to counter the Picayune’s narrative of 
black agitation by reporting on the murder of black citizens by Democrats and explicitly 
disputing the accounts of Democratic papers. The Republican’s headline regarding the 
same incident on Canal Street that the Picayune had suggested was due to black 
aggression inverts that premise: 
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Another Street Conflict. 
ASSASSINATION OF COLORED MEN. 
Great Excitement Saturday Night. 
SEVEN COLORED PERSONS KILLED 
Two White Men Killed. 
 
 “That it was an unprovoked assault is certain,” wrote the Republican, “the Democratic 
journals to the contrary notwithstanding” (October 26). In their articles and editorials 
they placed the blame on Democrats for the constant violence, condemned them for 
refusing to hire freedmen who voted on the radical ticket, and accused them of stealing 
and destroying registration papers. In addition, they praised the black population for their 
patience and peacefulness.  In one article, responding to Democratic resolutions that 
pledged to “protect every man, white or black, in his right to vote,” the Republican 
responded: “Let this question be asked: From whom, from whose violence do they 
propose to protect the colored voter? Out of their own mouths they are convicted” 
(November 3). By the time the election came to pass, the violence had gotten so severe 
that the Republican declared that it would be impossible to have a fair vote:  
We are certain that if every possible effort should be made it would be an 
impossibility to poll half of the real Republican vote in the State. If the effort 
should be made with the firmness and determination many polling places would 
simply become scenes of massacre. With these convictions we have this advice to 
offer Republicans throughout the state. Wherever you can vote without reasonable 
apprehension of being subjected to personal violence, do so….if you cannot, 
remain at home. (October 30) 
 
After the vote, which resulted in a Democratic victory in Louisiana, the Republican 
declared the election a “farce” (November 11). 
 While the Picayune could not deny the reality of a diminished black turnout to the 
polls, it took as the cause a conspiratorial effort by the Republicans to encourage blacks 
not to vote in order to make it appear as though there had been intimidation. This was 
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part of a larger campaign against the white element of the Republican Party. The 
Picayune reserved its most adamant antagonism for carpetbaggers, who they contended 
manipulated blacks and encouraged violence in order secure their own power. By 
painting the white Republican leadership in such a way, they also attempted to portray 
Democrats as the true friend of the black population and the freedmen. In an article 
surrounding a violent incident in Brasher City, the paper blames “the hungry adventurers 
who have flocked hither—to implant feelings of hatred in the hearts of the negro race, in 
order they might thereby incite and perpetuate a strife which they alone benefitted” 
(October 21). Reporting another incident, in which a black man was shot after supposedly 
“endeavoring to fire a musket at a white man engaged in a difficulty with a negro on the 
corner of the street,” the Picayune displayed a hint of sympathy for the eventual victim: 
“Ill advised and mistaken, he was but the instrument in the hands of those who should 
have known better. The real offenders escaped; the negro—the dupe—was alone the 
sufferer. It is the old story; the instrument has been punished, and the really guilty party is 
unmolested” (October 30). Depicting the carpetbaggers as strictly opportunists with no 
serious moral fortitude was an essential strategy of the Picayune. In one article they 
suggest that “there is not a shade of difference in the motives of the slaveholder and those 
of the carpet-bagger; only that the carpet-bagger puts on the air of a sleek humanitarian… 
If the negro knew the true history of his race, he would think the slave-holder altogether 
more reputable than the carpet-bagger” (October 28). Any attempts by white Republicans 
to advance political or social equality for the black population were never characterized 
as such—they were considered acts of aggression against Southern whites.  
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 In addition, the Picayune also suggested that the carpetbaggers fundamentally did 
not understand the freedmen. They wrote of Republican assumptions:  
It was supposed that the freedmen were an intellectual, intelligent class of men, 
who, when power was conferred upon them, would know how to wield it for their 
own supremacy: but it was discovered that their intellection, their self-reliance, 
their intelligence are a mere rope of sand, in which no confidence can be placed… 
It is now conceded on all sides that no political timber can be made out of the 
negro. He is found in the rough and must remain in the rough. He may be as black 
as mahogany, but he is utterly condemned for cabinet furniture. Horace makes an 
idol of Priapus to say, “I was a rude, misshapen log until the carpenter hewed and 
fashioned me into a god.” The Radicals tried the same experiment on the African, 
but without success; they found him a log, and must leave him a log. (October 25) 
 
With their reckless attempts at black equality, the Radicals upset what the Picayune 
portrayed as a relatively harmonious relationship between the races. After an incident in 
which two black prisoners in a Gretna jail were lynched by a mob of angry whites, the 
Picayune placed the blame squarely on Radicals for “the disruption of all the life long 
relations of the whites with the blacks” (October 25). In another article they suggest that 
after emancipation whites “imputed no fault to the negro, and conceding his freedom as 
unalterable, felt no resentment towards him, nor disposition to regain authority” (October 
25). 
 The Picayune’s relative tolerance towards blacks compared to carpetbaggers and 
their professed understanding of them provided a position from which they could appeal 
to the black vote. It was the Southern Democrats, who had lived close to black people 
their whole lives, who truly understood the way to structure a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the two races. The Picayune contended that, in fact, the interests of 
the Democratic Party and the black population of Louisiana were one in the same. 
“Among us the mutual interests were strong, the sympathies only slightly disturbed, and 
the knowledge of each other perfect,” wrote the Picayune on October 25. The “mutual 
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interests” they described, however, would not be realized through concessions to equality 
from the Democratic Party, nor the curtailment of violence. Rather, it depended on an 
awakening by the blacks in the state that the only way to find peace would be through the 
renunciation of their political rights. In a letter printed on October 21, supposedly written 
by freedmen, the Picayune claimed to have received just that renunciation:  
We, the undersigned, feeling convinced from the late events that have transpired 
in the parish, that the policy of the Radical party will give us not peace, but will 
lead only to riots and disorder, do herby withdraw from said party and renounce 
all affiliation with it. Knowing, moreover, that from our limited knowledge of 
politics, we are unable to act wisely in using the elective franchise, we do 
therefore withdraw there from entirely and renounce all right to register or vote, 
and agree to have nothing whatever to do with any party, or to meddle with 
politics in any ways. 
 
The Picayune took this letter as vindication of their claims: that Radical policies were the 
cause of violence, blacks were ignorant, and the carpetbaggers self-serving. The article 
follows with a few other examples throughout the state of blacks renouncing the vote, 
and then goes on to say: “The light of truth has at length struck the eyes of many among 
them. They begin to see that scalawags and carpet baggers are not their real friends, and 
that their only objects have been to make use of the colored people as tools for their own 
personal benefits and advancement” (October 21).  
 Of course, there was an irony in the Picayune’s sudden praise for black reasoning 
and recognition of truth when they renounced their own political rights, while the primary 
argument against granting them political rights in the first place was their inability to 
reason and their susceptibility to manipulation.  But this sort of contradiction was a 
standard element in the Picayune’s rhetoric on black political rights. On the one hand 
they denounced the violence they saw being committed by their own party, but they also 
depended on that very violence and chaos to demonstrate the inevitable results of 
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equality. They described blacks as uneducated and ignorant, but refused to acknowledge 
their own historical insistence that that be the case. Finally, they described blacks as 
lacking any agency in terms of their political decisions or acts of violence, and used those 
descriptions to deny black citizenship. Yet, simultaneously, they refused to take 
responsibility for the violence of their own party or acknowledge it as strategic 
intimidation. Rather, they described it as an unalterable condition of racial equality. In 
doing so they called in to question their own agency or ability to control their violent 
impulses. This self-fulfilling logic was a continuation of a perspective held by much of 
the South immediately following emancipation. In 1866, a man in Mississippi wrote a 
letter to Charles Sumner claiming that “the object of the Southerners appears to be to 
make good their often repeated assertions, to the effect that Negroes would die if they 
were freed. To make it so, they seem determined to goad them to desperation, in order to 
have an excuse to turn upon and annihilate them” (DuBois 1935, 148). 
 While the Republican made an effort to counter the most egregious of Democratic 
claims about black people, they stopped short of a full-throated endorsement of black 
equality or aligning the struggle of the Republican Party with the struggle of the 
freedmen. Indeed, they seemed disinclined to approach race as a political issue at all. In a 
November 10th editorial they wrote: 
The fight of the Republicans has never been for the negro; it has been for 
freedom—freedom of man, and of man’s right to write, to speak, and to live 
undisturbed in the existence of such right anywhere in this broad land of ours. 
When colored men plant themselves on the issue of “race” and band clannishly to 
give their race as such a superiority in power and direction of the State 
Government, they will find the white element of the Republican party actively 
antagonistic to them. 
 
The Republican did not view the Republican Party in Louisiana as being driven by the 
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interests of its racial majority, nor did it view itself as a voice speaking for or to that 
majority. That voice came from the New Orleans Tribune.  
 
The New Orleans Tribune 
 While there are no available issues of the New Orleans Tribune immediately 
surrounding the presidential election of 1868, issues from April, the month in which the 
state voted on the new state constitution, and from December of that year, provide a 
relatively clear picture of the paper’s position on racial politics and its relationship to 
both the Republican and the Picayune. The New Orleans Tribune saw the contradictions 
in the Democratic arguments and made it their primary duty to point them out. As such, 
many of their editorials in 1868 were structured as critiques of articles in other 
newspapers and journals in the city. In an editorial leading up to the vote on the 
Constitution of 1868, the Tribune addressed the Democratic journals of the city, which 
were attempting to turn the black vote against it. Their appeals, argued the Tribune, were 
based solely on arousing fear and the threat of violence. “But is it not a strange 
spectacle,” asked the Tribune, “an intelligent people, professing to be high-minded, 
generous and Christian, far in advance of their Northern neighbors, uniting through their 
press in one universal threat of their displeasure against a portion of their fellow-citizens, 
for no other conceivable crime than striving in a peaceful and lawful way to make sure of 
their freedom?” (April 22).  In an April 14 editorial the Tribune took on a criticism made 
by a Democratic newspaper that most of the blacks who would be voting on the state 
constitution were illiterate. “Very likely, but who is to blame?” asked the Tribune. “Had  
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the old Constitution granted them the same educational advantages which the new does, 
they might be able to “read, write, and spell.”  
 In their own political appeals the Tribune stressed a consistency based on the 
principles of liberty, equality, and democracy. Editorials theorized about their true 
meanings. On April 17, in an editorial “Liberty for all or Liberty for None,” the Tribune 
argued that slavery in the South had “corrupted the sentiment of liberty” and made it a 
privilege rather than a right. As such, Liberty existed as something that could be handed 
out, and more importantly, revoked. This, argued the Tribune, should be alarming for 
citizens of all races: “Will, then, the common people, (we speak irrespective of color) 
hold their liberty secure? Let them regard liberty as a Right, common to mankind. Let 
them not withhold from any of their fellow men what they demand for themselves.” In 
another, “True Liberty and It’s Counterfeit,” the Tribune goes on to distinguish between 
liberty and toleration. “Toleration is in fact only one phase of tyranny; tyranny in smiles, 
but tyranny still. For he who can permit may refuse.  Toleration implies the right to 
withhold tomorrow what is granted to-day…This surely is not liberty” (April 23). The 
Tribune contested that their claim to political and civil rights was in fact a preservation of 
fundamental American values, as opposed to simply a radical overthrow of racial 
hierarchy. 
 As a way of emphasizing their consistency, the Tribune regularly reminded their 
readers that they had opposed disenfranchisement of former Confederates at the state 
convention.  “It was our wish that all the people should have an equal share in legislation 
and government,” they wrote on April 23. “We were willing to forget the bad fact of 
rebellion, in our desire for conciliation and peace. A risk, we know, would be thereby 
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incurred, but we were ready to take our chance with the rest, even though, in that case, 
the numerical advantage would have been against us.” These reminders not only proved 
the fortitude of their principles, but also were used combat the notion being put forward 
by Democratic papers that the Radicals were conspiring to secure black supremacy. “But 
you cannot endure black supremacy,” wrote the Tribune, “Well, we do not care to be 
supreme…All we want is our rights.” They go on to reassure the Democrats that if they 
were to encourage immigration “from whatever quarter,” they would soon regain their 
political advantage.  At the same time, the Tribune understood that the potential result of 
the franchise for former Confederates was having their own franchise revoked. “We 
advocate a rule that works both ways,” they wrote. “It would be absurd in us to untie the 
hands of those who might at once proceed to tie up ours, without our having a chance to 
resist” (December 29). 
 The Tribune was also willing to use Democratic narrative of race relations and 
depictions of blacks as uncivilized and ignorant to point out the glaring contradiction in 
their professed paternalism and Christian generosity towards the former slaves and the 
reality of their actions towards them: 
We used to hear it said that slavery was a missionary institution for the civilizing 
and Christianizing of the black race. Does it not seem strange that the agents 
working for that institution should now, in their new relation to the “heathen” 
among them, spend their breath in abuse and ridicule of those people? One would 
almost suppose that these “missionaries,” in imparting civilization and 
Christianity to others, had left none for themselves. (April 26) 
 
While these arguments appear tongue-in-cheek, they provided another opportunity for the 
Tribune to make their case for equality without entirely destabilizing the racial hierarchy, 
and also appealing to the ego of the Southern whites who regarded their race as superior. 
“We should call it honorable,” wrote the Tribune, “for a powerful, intelligent and 
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Christian people to hold out the hand of welcome to a weaker, less educated race, and to 
encourage their every endeavor at self improvement” (April 26). And like the Picayune, 
the Tribune also appealed to the historical relationship between races. In one editorial 
they suggested that the experience of having lived with white people for so long would 
give freedmen in America a certain level of political aptitude that the slaves in Haiti did 
not possess following the Haitian revolution: “It should be remembered that in our 
country the colored people have been living for two centuries among a “superior” race,” 
wrote the Tribune, “distinguished for intelligence, enterprise, a practical familiarity with 
the principles of law, a remarkable aptitude for government, and a high-toned Christian 
sentiment...With all the compulsory ignorance of multitudes of American blacks, the 
influence of their white brethren ought to tell upon their character” (April 24). 
 Ultimately, the Tribune was firm in its belief in the political agency and integrity of 
black people, and their ultimate steadfastness on the issue of their own equality. In a last 
ditch appeal to compel black voters to vote against the new constitution, a number of 
Democratic candidates for the state legislature held a barbecue and encouraged planters 
to place “their horses and wagons at the disposition of ‘their negroes’ to enable them to 
attend” (April 10).  The Tribune was supportive of the opportunity for black people to 
“hear all sides,” but was not concerned that the flattery would persuade any of the 
attendees to vote against their own interests:  
They will eat and make merry; but whether any number of them can be induced 
by these gastronomic appeals to vote against the “Black Crook” Constitution, we 
have serious doubts. The savory argument will be hugely appropriated and 
appreciated, and fully assimilated, but whether the assimilation will be 
sufficiently Democratic, is another question. (April 10) 
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Similarly, around Christmas, the Democratic paper The Planter’s Banner ran an article 
suggesting that “the negroes have now dropped politics” and the planters, in turn, should 
“give them a big dinner, and the materials for a general frolic.” The Tribune, however, 
was having none of the suggestion: “We trust that none of our people will suffer 
themselves to be duped by ‘big dinners and a general frolic,’ to abandon politics. Our 
liberties are in our own hands, and must not be thrown away for ‘fiddles and bows’” 
(December 29).  
 
Conclusion 
“Equality,” wrote the Picayune, “is a fine thing in fancy, but there is no such thing 
as equality in nature, no such thing in this world, and there will be none in the world to 
come” (October 28).  Reading the Daily Picayune and the New Orleans Tribune in 1868, 
one finds what appear to be fully formed and totally irreconcilable views on racial 
equality, universal suffrage, and integration. To the Picayune, any attempt by the Radical 
Republicans to secure or exercise the rights of citizenship for the black population was 
seen as an act of intentional antagonism towards them. While they would not encourage 
it, the violence that occurred as a response to that antagonism was regarded as 
unavoidable by the Picayune.  Understood in the context of their political position, it was 
necessary.  
Those rights of citizenship for blacks, along with basic security, were the only 
things that mattered to the Tribune. And while they made the struggle of freedmen their 
unapologetic focus, they based their demands on a set of principles that were necessarily 
unattached to race. The ultimate logic of those principles demanded not just equal rights, 
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but eventual integration. Praising integrated Northern universities, the Tribune wrote that 
they “are not the result of fanaticism nor an exceptional fact, but perfectly in a line with 
the liberal spirit of the age, as they are with the fundamental principles of justice and 
equity, and the genius of our Republican Government” (December 18). Despite the threat 
faced by the black population of Louisiana and the atrocities committed against them, the 
Tribune did not view their demands as self-defeating. They saw them as the natural 
culmination of their history since emancipation. 
“To describe the significance of freedom to four million black slaves of the South 
is to test severely our historical imagination,” wrote Leon Litwack (1979, xii). Perhaps it 
is an equally severe test of our imagination to describe the ideological chasm that split 
Louisiana (along with the rest of the South) at the outset of Radical Reconstruction. It is 
hard to imagine a more divided and uncertain politics in a democracy. Yet, on each side 
there were gestures made to the opposition in a distant hope that they could be persuaded. 
It is worth noting what exactly each side was asking of the other. The Picayune, in its 
attempts, was asking the freedmen to forgo all claims to political involvement, and in 
effect, renounce their own humanity. Conversely, the Tribune seemed to be pleading with 
the white people of Louisiana to, in fact, live up to their professed ideals, to demonstrate 
their superiority and generosity, and most essentially, to become more humane.  
It is more difficult to find in the Republican a similarly cohesive position on racial 
equality, or what they believed the future for black Louisianans should look like. They 
were willing to defend the character of black people, and bring attention to the violence 
being committed against them. But they stopped well short of extolling the virtues of 
racial equality or integration. This hesitation did not go unnoticed by the black 
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population. In a single biting observation, the Tribune noted: “The New Orleans 
Republican of Tuesday evening, contains a long article on public education, in which it 
takes good care to say nothing about mixed schools” (December 10). Tunnell suggests 
that being considered at the forefront of a mostly black movement caused the white 
leadership in the Republican Party significant discomfort. “A harsh verdict can scarcely 
be avoided,” he wrote. “Reconstruction failed on the lower Mississippi mainly because 
Louisiana whites believed more devoutly in white supremacy than the Radicals believed 
in the rights of man” (1984, 217) The 1868 New Orleans Republican provides significant 
evidence to support that verdict.  
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Chapter Three: 1876 
In the drawn out centennial election contest between Rutheford B. Hayes and 
Samuel Tilden, one thing the nation succeeded in was narrowly avoiding a descent into 
complete violence and chaos. “Indeed,” writes Roy Morris Jr., “one ill-chosen word from 
Tilden might well have ignited another Civil War, this time between rival political parties 
rather than geographical regions” (2003, 3).  Instead, Morris suggests, the back-room 
dealing that eventually decided the election simultaneously disenfranchised over 4 
million Democratic voters, abandoned the nations guarantee to protect Southern blacks 
(leading to nearly a century of segregation and terror under Jim Crow) and undermined 
the credibility of the entire political and electoral system for years to come (2003, 4).  
In all this, Louisiana played an essential role. Along with South Carolina and 
Florida, the Returning Board in Louisiana invalidated enough Democratic votes due to 
reported intimidation to swing the state for Hayes.  Whether or not there was actually 
enough intimidation to make the Returning Board’s action legitimate is still a point of 
historical contention. Morris finds the proposition dubious (2003, 182). Joe Taylor, 
however, throws his lot in with early 20th century historian and Conservative sympathizer 
Ella Lonn, who wrote that “in such a maze of assertions and denials, bribery and counter-
bribery, and false testimony contradicted and retracted, the truth is well-nigh hopelessly 
buried” (Lonn 1918, 452; Taylor 1984, 492).  In any case, the final results of the 
compromise of 1877 put Hayes in the oval office, Democrat Francis T. Nicholls in 
Louisiana’s Governors office, and saw the removal of federal troops from New Orleans 
on the 15th anniversary of their arrival in 1862. The attempt at Southern Reconstruction 
came to an end.  
		 36 
In their own ways, each of the New Orleans newspapers considered here 
anticipated some aspect of the electoral result and its meaning. The Picayune both saw 
the potential for a victory by appealing to the black vote, and also feared the possibility of 
electoral victory being taken from them by the Returning Board. The Republican made 
ominous predictions regarding the future of the South under Democratic rule and the 
curtailment of rights for African-Americans that would eventually come to prove 
frighteningly accurate. And the Louisianian, for its part, seemed to sense that no matter 
the result of the election, the Republican Party and the nation as a whole seemed to be 
quickly losing interest in its recent commitment to racial equality. 
  
The Daily Picayune and the New Orleans Republican 
In the weeks surrounding the election of 1876, the New Orleans Republican and 
the Daily Picayune, as they had done in 1868, traded accusations of fraud, intimidation, 
and deceit. The Republican referred to any intimidation of Republican voters as 
“bulldozing.” The Picayune, in turn, warned that Republicans in certain parishes would 
use overblown accusations of intimidation to throw out legitimate votes. They called it 
“Ku-Kluxing” the vote. A Republican effort to root out fraudulent voter registration in 
New Orleans purged nearly ten thousand false names from the voter rolls. The Picayune 
dubbed this effort the “Sewing Machine Trick” (Republicans had sent out sewing 
machine advertisements to verify addresses), and portrayed it as an attempt to suppress 
legitimate voting. Each side appeared convinced that the only way the other could win 
was through intimidation and fraud. On November 1, the Republican printed an 
accusation that the Democratic ballot was being printed in a way that would not allow 
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voters to write in the candidate they preferred. “This is a manifestation of the doubts 
entertained by the Democratic managers of the people they claim as followers,” wrote the 
Republican. “It is a deliberate attempt to prevent them from exercising their honest 
judgment and freedom of opinion, and in this respect is an insult to their manly 
independence.” On November 5th, two days before the election, the Picayune suggested 
there was an attempt to undermine voting in conservative parishes, alleging that “some of 
the registration office records have been spirited away, and in other instances the 
supervisors have failed to designate polling places.”  The extent and persistence of such 
accusations reflected each side’s anxieties about the stakes of the election, and their 
distrust of one another. The distinct ways that each paper portrayed those stakes reveals 
how they understood the position of blacks in relation to their party and to Louisiana as a 
whole.  
“It is universally conceded,” wrote the Picayune the day before the election, “that 
the Presidential election to be held tomorrow involves more important interests than has 
any other in the history of this country” (November 6). It spared no exuberance in 
describing what they believed would be the outcome of a Democratic victory.  On 
October 28th they wrote: 
We believe that on the night of November 7, next, an electric storm of good news 
will sweep hither announcing the triumph of constitutional principles, and the 
rebuke, the discomfiture, the final defeat of aggressive Radicalism, of pseudo-
philanthropy, of centralism, of nepotism and carpet-baggers all over the length 
and breadth of the land.  
 
The overthrow of what they saw as an illegitimate Radical government was one facet of 
the Picayune’s vision. Another was a holistic improvement in the state’s economic 
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position. “In Louisiana, particularly, the triumph of Conservatism is necessary to revive 
the prosperity of the people,” the Picayune wrote on November 4th: 
The election of Gen. Nicholls would restore confidence and enterprise to every 
department of business. Capital, which has been frightened away by 
misgovernment and political spoliation, would flow back into our city, to be 
distributed in developing the industries of the people and the resources of the 
state. Immigration, which has shunned our shores during the reign of corruption, 
would soon populate the fertile lands of the interior. The State credit would be 
restored and the value of her securities advanced, for capital, both at home and 
abroad, will accept Gen. Nicholl’s election as a guarantee of an honest and 
capable and tranquil administration.  
 
The promise of prosperity was not relegated to the Picayune’s white readers. They 
pointed to Democratic administrations in other states that had supposedly increased the 
wealth of the black population as well. On November 1st they wrote:  
The Republican party claims to have done a great deal for the negroes; but the 
statistics show that they have grown weary in the good work, and that the 
Democrats have come to their relief. For instance, the average wages of a farm 
laborer in Georgia are $12 per month; just across the river in South Carolina only 
$8. At the close of the Bullock administration the Georgia blacks owned 
altogether $600,000; four years of Democratic rule have increased their wealth to 
$6,000,000. 
 
Economic appeals were part of a larger attempt by the Picayune and the Democratic 
Party to win over black voters. In 1876, for the first time, the national Democratic 
platform committed to upholding the law as dictated by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth amendments. The actual sincerity of the parties commitment to the black 
population, however, was strongly challenged by the Republican—and to some degree 
tempered by the Picayune’s own shifty rhetoric on equality and race relations.  
“The seventh of November is charged with the grave portent to the American 
people in the second century of their national life,” wrote the Republican on October 26. 
“If the North should fail to arouse the momentousness of the issue, its direst threatenings 
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must befall.” The Republican, like the Picayune, focused on the potential consequences 
of a Democratic victory and viewed it with no less seriousness. But where the Picayune 
was jubilant, the Republican was foreboding, and where the Picayune pointed to a 
prosperous future under a Democratic regime, the Republican warned of the return to the 
solid Democratic South that existed before the war, and everything that implied: 
Let the North fully understand that if in this centennial year, force and fraud are 
permitted to achieve a solid Democratic South, that victory will be a permanency; 
that the ante-bellum sectional lines are thereby at once re-established; that the 
gage is thrown for a renewal of the bloody strife of last decade, whatever be the 
immediate issue which the politicians invent. (October 26) 
 
Memories of the horrors of the war and the conditions of the antebellum South, along 
with the threat of another Civil War, provided the thrust of the Republicans appeal to 
voters before the election. In one editorial they mocked Samuel Tilden for avoiding the 
subject of Democratic Party’s past: “‘Let us look at the bright Democratic present,” says 
Samuel, ‘and the dazzling future. Let us forget the unhappy past, and look at something 
cheerful, look at me on my way to the White House’” (October 27). These appeals often 
drifted into what the Picayune and the Democrats pejoratively called “waving the bloody 
shirt”-- emotional reminders of the losses suffered during the war: 
We are willing to forget the Democratic past, and to forget Tilden, but there are 
glories won by Republicans in the war for the Union, there are acts of sacrifice 
and heroism, there are men like the martyr Lincoln, like Sumner, Seward and 
Stanton, there are dead soldiers left on strange fields, there are the grateful tears of 
a people released from bonds, and there are thousands of noble men, acts, words 
and deeds of the glorious past we can not and would not forget; not for our own 
sake, not to oblige Tilden. (October 27) 
 
This rhetoric seemed specifically focused on guilt-tripping any Northern Democrats who 
likely would have had allegiances to the Union during the war, and to spur federal 
intervention to ensure a fair election.  
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But perhaps the fundamental warning the Republican issued during the weeks 
surrounding the election was with regard to the likely fate of the black population in a 
Democratic South. To varying degrees, the Republican suggested that should Democrats 
gain control of the South, along with the presidency, they would “subjugate the colored 
race to something approximating slavery” (November 4). Or, at the least, they would use 
their power to effectively disenfranchise blacks. In one editorial, entitled “The War Over 
Again,” the Republican paints a distressingly accurate picture of the Jim Crow South that 
would become the reality in the decades to follow. Of course, it was not the election 
result that they feared that led to it. The passage is worth quoting at length for both its 
prescience and irony. Referring to the black population in the case of a Democratic 
victory, the Republican wrote: 
They will be the prisoners of the war….They may be subjected to a copy of the 
law of Texas or of Georgia, or to the social despotism of Mississippi or Alabama. 
Within their fatal inclosure they may groan in political bondage, but with the 
exclusive right of the State to administer its own laws over its own citizens— with 
a President who will not intervene to protect a citizen of the United States, unless 
called upon to do so by the authorities of the State within which the citizen 
resides, there will be practically no protection. If the Democratic party shall 
conquer in this war they will carry the colored voters into a captivity from which 
their can be neither ransom nor escape. Let them come up to what may be their 
last free ballot, as men who have before them the alternative of political freedom 
or political death. (November 7) 
 
This ultimate accuracy of this prediction would slowly unfold, beginning with the 
compromise of 1877 and continuing as Jim Crow policies formalized.  
 After Election Day, as the results were being reviewed and party officials from 
the North travelled to Louisiana, the Republican doubled down on their accusations of 
intimidation and fraud. They also suggested what the consequences of effective 
disenfranchisement could be for blacks, and for the South as a whole. One possibility was 
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the voluntary renunciation of their franchise, which would have depleted the 
representation of the South in the U.S. legislature. However, the Republican deemed this 
unlikely. What it felt was more probable was the mass migration of Southern blacks to 
other parts of the world. “It is extremely probable that contiguous territory can be found,” 
they wrote on November 15th, “in which the negro shall be rated at his full value not only 
in the industrial sense, but as a political integer.” Mexico, Central American, and the 
Caribbean Islands were all offered as potential destinations for black Southerners. This 
suggestion was not just innocent speculation, but also a warning to Southern planters of 
the detrimental effects it would have on the economy and political representation of the 
South: 
With our own sugar fields deserted and those of San Domingo peopled by the 
magnificent body of laborers to whom Louisiana owes nearly every dollar of 
wealth she has, the question of a tariff on our sugar would become too 
insignificant to merit the indignation of the most orthodox Northern Democrat. At 
the same time the industrial arm of the South thus paralyzed, the scepter of 
political power would be changed into a buffoon’s stick, the North and the world 
would lose all interest in the shiftless unthrifty people who remained, and the 
great question which has kept a whole continent in hot water for three-quarters of 
a century would become asphyxiated by the loss at one and the same time of the 
backbone of contention and the chief prop of productive power. (November 15) 
 
For the Republican, the potential for mass migration existed as one of the only recourses 
for blacks in the case of a Democratic South expressed. 
The Picayune pushed back against the idea that a Democratic victory would mean 
the subjugation of black Louisianans. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the politics of 
race was the same as during the election of 1868, and based on an attempt to draw the 
black vote away from the Republican Party. While perhaps less vigorously, they revived 
their accusations that manipulative carpetbaggers did not deserve the loyalty of the black 
population and continued their attempts to undermine the moral superiority of the North 
		 42 
by providing their version of the ideological history of abolitionism: “After 1808, the 
New England people found it more profitable to hire white servants than to keep slaves,” 
wrote the Picayune on October 29, “and mistaking the promptings of self-interest for that 
of high moral duty, they sought to justify themselves by bitterly attacking the South and 
loudly applauding their own conduct.” In accordance with the Democratic Party’s 
platform that endorsed protecting the new constitutional rights of freedmen, the Picayune 
also seemed to become somewhat more liberal in its rhetoric. While the paper still 
featured some portrayals of black criminality, they were not nearly as central to its 
coverage as they had been in 1868. Inevitable racial violence was no longer a preferred 
rallying cry against the radical agenda, nor were explicit depictions of blacks as unfit for 
political participation. Rather than publishing letters from blacks renouncing their own 
political rights as they had done in ‘68, they instead published letters from blacks 
declaring their support for the Democrats. In this way the Picayune expanded its efforts 
to appeal to the black population. A letter published in the Picayune on October 29th went 
as far as to say that “no thinking man in the South would, if it were in his power, deprive 
the negro of a single right.”  
The paper’s strong appeals were not without their caveats. That same letter went 
on to argue that while there should be black suffrage, because blacks pay taxes, “no sane 
man, unless a knave, can advocate social equality; it is unnatural, and does not exist 
among any people, civilized or barbarian….The perversion of this word equality has been 
made the pivot on which the Radicals have south to turn many a political outrage” 
(October 29).  A speech by Col. W.D. Burton published in the Picayune strongly 
countered the accusation that a Democratic victory would mean a return to slavery for 
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black Louisianans. His reasoning, however, did not suggest any principled Democratic 
stance against the possibility, only that the Party’s commitment to upholding the 
constitution would make it logistically unfeasible. Addressing the black members of the 
audience, Burton assured them that returning them to slavery would be “utterly 
impossible, without a change in the constitution, and no change of this sort could take 
place without submitting it to a vote of the people, and you would have as much right to 
vote on this question as anybody else, and I know you would not vote yourselves back 
into slavery” (October 29). In an editorial, entitled “Law-Making” (November 1), the 
Picayune warned of the difference between “genuine law and an arbitrary enactment; the 
one being a necessity arising out of the very nature of things, the other often the result of 
whim, prejudice or interested motive.” The editorial did not mention race, but blamed the 
spirit of legislating beyond customs as the cause of the Civil War: “It was this spirit of 
innovation which brought on the war and reduced the country to that unhappy condition 
from which nothing can now relieve it but a general Conservative victory throughout the 
country.”  Finally, in at least one instance, the prospect of black extinction in the United 
States was given voice in the Picayune in 1876. “I am sorry to say that the condition of 
the negroes seems to me to be relatively less favorable than that of the whites,” wrote a 
correspondent in a special dispatch from Paris, “and that the more I study the results of 
the abolition of slavery the more inclined I am to share the opinion of the people here, 
namely that the abolition of slavery will end in the early or late but inevitable exhaustion 
of the negro race in the United States” (October 29). 
The Republican did its best to expose the shift in the Democrat’s racial platform 
as empty rhetoric and doublespeak, and they found a target in Samuel Tilden specifically. 
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“Having cut loose from the almost chronic position of opposition to the fourteenth 
amendment,” they wrote in one editorial,  “which has been the backbone of every 
Democratic platform speech or essay since the war, Tilden trips lightly and gaily along in 
defense of his newly found political creed” (October 26).  But Tilden’s words, they 
argued, had different meanings for his Northern and Southern audiences. Of his claim 
that no rebel debt would be paid—for loss or damage of property, including slaves—the 
Republican wrote:  
No man knows better than Tilden the difference that exists between the North and 
South in defining the words “rebel” and “disloyal.” When he tells the New 
Yorkers that the rebel debt must not be paid he winks at Ben Hill and Hamburg 
Butler knowingly, as if to say: “Hush! you know I hold that the Confederates 
were not rebels. Therefore I don’t mean you, but these New Yorkers will think I 
do, which will help our reform movement. (October 26) 
 
The Republican also pointed to another instance in which there were discrepancies 
between the rhetoric and intentions of Southern Democrats and the understanding of 
Northern Democrats. In the United States Congress a Northern Democrat, Scott Lord, 
introduced a resolution that would punish anyone involved in attempts at voter 
intimidation or suppression. Lord, wrote the Republican, 
had listened to Southern orators during the session, and heard time and again that 
the solid South was full of peace and fairness; that there was no disposition to 
bulldoze, intimidate or deprive any man of his rights at the polls. Mr. Lord, as a 
Democratic statesman, took the orators at their word, and conceived the idea of 
patting the sentiments expressed into a resolution. He believed the resolution 
would silence Republicans, while, if Southern Democrats were honest, it could 
not hurt the Democratic cause. (November 2) 
 
The result, however, was that nearly all the Southern Democratic congressman abstained 
from voting on the resolution. “The idea of punishing a man with death, imprisonment, or 
even fine, for committing election frauds or intimidating a nigger, was too much for 
Southern chivalry,” declared the Republican.   
		 45 
Attempting to discern the Republican’s own vision for the black population of the 
South outside of their warnings against Democratic rule, however, is a more difficult 
task. As the Picayune criticized, the Republican understood the blacks in Louisiana as a 
constituency whose vote they had already earned via emancipation and Radical 
legislation. Rather than offering them a program for improvement, they cautioned them to 
vote responsibly: 
Let every man of the colored race remember that he and his race are still on trial 
before the world, and cast his vote as if in the actual presence of the whole 
country, North and South, well-wishers and ill-wishers; as if though thousands of 
Union soldiers who perished on the battle fields of the war in the cause of 
freedom were surrounding the ballot box; as if the piercing gaze of Sumner and 
the mild glance of the martyred Lincoln were anxiously looking down upon the 
important act. (November 5) 
 
In a number of instances the Republican seemed to equate black “qualification” for 
citizenship with their allegiance to the Republican Party and their willingness to 
withstand the threats and appeals from Democrats. This is perhaps most apparent in a 
praise-filled editorial after the election, tellingly entitled “Our Colored Voters”: 
The colored people of this state have just given us an example of fortitude and 
fidelity which is worthy of all emulation and praise. They have stood firmly by 
their principles and their leaders; they have been faithful to their pledges and true 
to each other. Threats have been employed in vain; murder, whipping, 
intimidation have proved ineffectual to turn them from a settled purpose to vote 
the Republican ticket…. Both sexes of the colored race have fully established 
their claim to the franchise and vindicated the wisdom of those who fought to give 
them human rights. (November 10) 
 
The implication in the editorial is the black “claim to franchise” was somehow 
inextricable from their “purpose to vote for the Republican ticket.” And in fact, for 
Republicans, starting with emancipation, a means of securing their own power was 
perhaps the fundamental way in which they understood the freedmen. “We are depending 
now upon the negro vote precisely as we depended in the war upon the negro soldier,” 
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wrote the Republican as the election results were being disputed. “There appears now 
something prophetic in the words of Abraham Lincoln: ‘The time may come when the 
colored freedman by his ballot shall restore the jewel of liberty to the diadem of the 
republic.’ One would think that the sainted martyr prophesied this day and this hour. Let 
us hope for the best” (November 15). Unfortunately for the Republicans, that assumption 
of allegiance frustrated many blacks in Louisiana and in many cases caused them to 
question the Republican Party’s commitment to them, and theirs to the party.  
 
The Weekly Louisianian     
By the fall of 1875, in the only black-owned paper in Louisiana, weariness with 
the Republican Party and with being regarded simply as a means to secure political 
power, was easily detectable. “The campaign of 1876 is approaching,” a letter from R.L 
Desdunder began. “May I say that it is the only time, when the colored element is 
considered of any consequence, and seems to call for any regard from the greedy 
expectants for official stations?” The letter goes on to grapple with an allegiance to the 
principles of the Republican party, “the civil and political equality of all men,” while also 
confronting a desperate reality that Republicans in power had done little to relieve: 
“Since reconstruction, colored men in certain states have passed from one vicissitude to 
another of unmitigated anguish and cruel suffering, aggravated by party injustice and 
treachery. Such a life is not endurable, and must come to an end.” Desdunder, however, 
concluded that the blacks in Louisiana could “dam the floods of corruption and 
faithlessness” within the Republican party: “We do not propose to establish a color line 
party, because such a thing is impracticable and in direct opposition to the noble 
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principles of our design ….We need not desert our party to choose honest and fearless 
men; such men can be found, and will, I trust, offer themselves at the proper time” 
(October 30, 1875). 
Others were skeptical even of the Republican Party’s principles. Another letter in 
the Louisianian began: “In a former communication I asserted that the Republican party 
does not sympathize with the negro—does not actually believe in his essential manhood 
and as a consequence his dual claim to all the rights of citizenship as accorded to the 
whites.” Nor were these failings, according to the letter, in any way deviating from the 
historical attitudes of the Republican Party and its relationship to Southern blacks. While 
the Republican cast their Party’s historic reliance on blacks to maintain power as a 
mutually beneficial relationship, the Louisianian represented it as something closer to 
exploitation: 
This want of sympathy while it did not prevent the party from using the negro as a 
means first to crush the rebellion and then prematurely to rehabilitate the 
collapsed framework of government in the seceded States, permits the former 
rebels in regaining their own fortified citizenship clearly to disregard and trample 
under foot that of the negro whose services in time of the nations peril entitles 
him to the fullest protection now that the danger is seemingly passed. The party is 
satisfied to have restored throughout the South the form of Republican 
government while the substance is entirely wanting. (December 25, 1875) 
 
These opposing historical narratives, along with the contention that substantively the 
Republican Party was doing little to improve the lives of black people, drove a significant 
wedge between the two. 
In response to this disillusionment with the Republicans, the Louisianian urgently 
called for the development of independent political agency and capital, and unity within 
the black population. Again, these calls expressed varying ideas regarding the extent to 
which this meant spurning the party establishment, or working within it. In another letter, 
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Desdunder, without specifically calling for allegiance to the Republican Party, suggested 
that unity was a necessity primarily as a buffer against the greater threat of Democrats: 
“Never before in the history of our race was unity more imperatively required than now 
when the party of reaction is so bent upon our utter annihilation. In organization now 
means protection against the terrible crash of the future” (December 4, 1875). But all 
calls were not so conciliatory. In an editorial anticipating the Colored National 
Convention in Nashville, the Louisianian questioned in no uncertain terms the 
Republican government’s commitment to protecting blacks in the South: “If it needs be 
that we shall drag our mangled and mutilated forms from those fields of desolation, of 
human butchery and bloody carnage to say to the American Government: ‘This is the 
protection you have given us!’ let us do it” (December 25, 1875). And others were even 
more explicit about the need to cast off white patronage to secure self determination. One 
editorial made similarly bleak, Jim Crow-like, predictions that the Republican had made 
regarding the possibility of a Democratic victory. This editorial, however, warned against 
any system of white political determination over blacks: 
The time has come even sooner than I anticipated when the Negro vote must be 
recognized and respected, not only as a “force” but as a determining balance of 
power in American politics. In order to make this power effective, however, the 
whole system of white political overseership of the Negro must be overthrown. 
The Negro must now stand for himself and vindicate himself. No one can stand 
for him and vindicate him in the crisis. If he is not man enough to seize the 
present opportunity and utilize it, he will sink naturally into a position of 
permanent subordination to the white race. He will in such case become the serf 
substratum in one social formation of a purely white mans government. (January 
22, 1876) 
 
 For the Louisianian, the goal of unity was not simply protecting the rights already 
guaranteed them by the constitutional amendments, but to further improve the lives of 
blacks. These specific suggestions went beyond anything in either the Picayune or the 
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Republican, focusing on issues like integration, economic independence, and educational 
opportunities. And with regard to these issues as well, the sense was that, more than ever, 
black people needed to fend for themselves. One editorial, “Combine,” focused on 
unifying the race in order to find capital so that they could secure landed homes. “The 
need of this policy of combination,” they wrote, “is rendered imperative from the fact that 
we are as a race being left more and more to our own resources.” A letter to the editor on 
the same day called for a boycott of institutions that discriminated against blacks:  
I now ask that the Mignonette and other literary, social, and benevolent clubs and 
societies among the colored people of New Orleans, notable, should lead off in 
the matter of resolving that none of their members shall further aid in the erection 
of barriers to enjoyment of civil rights by all classes of citizens alike, in the matter 
of the service of their money for public amusement by contributing one dime to 
theaters, or other places where the Yankee proprietors and managers, whether of 
the North or South, would impose hateful class distinctions.  
 
Suggesting actual attempts to secure economic stability and social equality went far 
beyond anything called for by the Republican, and set the Louisianan apart as a 
significantly more progressive paper in terms of race. 
These themes—uncertainty with the Republican Party, a desire for unity, and 
visions for substantive change— which appeared in the Louisianian prior to the Hayes’ 
inauguration and his decision to withdraw federal troops from the South gained in 
strength after the election. The confirmation of Republican indifference to their struggle 
was simultaneously a confirmation of the necessity of their own self-reliance and political 
independence. “Betrayed by our government we helped to put in power,” wrote the 
Louisianian in October, 1877, eight months after Hayes’ inauguration, “by its withdrawal 
of that protection, which we had a right to expect….we must awake to a full realization of 
our situation and remember that resting upon our own resources and dependent upon our 
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own endeavors we are in the future, to be precisely what we make ourselves.” This 
sentiment was reiterated time and again in the Louisianian after the election. The disdain 
for the Republican leadership in the South in the Louisianian even, on occasion, 
resembled the rhetoric in the Democratic press that besmirched the carpetbaggers eight 
years earlier. “The war brought large numbers of needy adventurers into our midst, the 
reconstruction acts threw us, an inexperienced element, in the political arena” they wrote. 
“The wily rascals who managed to come among us, soon discovered our helplessness, 
and with devilish ingenuity managed to ingratiate themselves into our favor and secure 
the leadership our necessities demanded” (November 17, 1877). 
   Despite the stark political circumstances faced by the black population, the 
Louisianian’s calls for self-determination were coupled with visions of progress. They 
strongly rebuked a suggestion by another newspaper that integrated schools would never 
be implemented in practice, despite being legally mandated, pointing to Northern states in 
which schools were integrated over similar objections. “In view of these incontrovertible 
facts and the extraordinary changes that have taken place in the status of the colored race 
in the last decade,” wrote the Louisianian, “we confidently look forward to the 
accomplishment of like results in Louisiana” (October 6, 1877).  They called for training 
more black female teachers and refused the notion of black colonization in Liberia or 
elsewhere. In response to a quote by Wade Hampton, the Democratic Governor of South 
Carolina, that he would like “the colored people to become land-owners, for then they 
will become conservative,” the Louisianian responded: “Yes, break up all the large 
estates, sell them land on long time and easy terms, build school houses at every 
crossroads, and they will surely become conservators” (November 17, 1877). In some 
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cases it was suggested that in fact the black population was better off without protection 
from the Republicans and the federal government. “Our emancipation from control of the 
men who have been our advisors and who have used us mainly to their own advantage is 
already demonstrating our capacity and resources, and show forces in us not to be 
despised” (November 17, 1877).   
The Louisianian itself was seen as a demonstration of the “capacity and resources” 
of the black population. As one letter on November 10th, 1877, advocated making the 
paper a national publication, noting the “capacity, persistence, pluck and devotion to 
principle of the editor”:  
With such a journal circulated throughout the country, keeping abreast of the times 
on all public questions, independent in sentiment, impartial and fearless in 
criticism, impersonal in character and true to the sentiment of equal rights in its 
broadest sense we have the means at hand to bring order out of chaos, and reduce 
the demoralized and despondent condition of our people to do a better and more 
hopeful state. 
 
This view of the paper as a pillar of black unity, endurance, and progress, is an accurate 
reflection of the values that the paper stressed in its content. But, as with the relative 
political power experienced by African-American’s at the time, there was an expiration 
date. The newspaper continued its weekly publication until five years later when it 
folded, in 1882. 
 
Conclusion 
          Cutting through the accusations of fraud and intimidation, the fear-mongering, and 
the characterizations of their opposing side’s intentions, one finds in the New Orleans 
Republican and The Daily Picayune relatively similar professed beliefs regarding the 
social position of black people the state of Louisiana in 1876. With the shift in 
		 52 
Democratic Party platform to include support for the constitutional amendments, both 
papers were ostensibly on the same page in terms of defending political and civil equality 
for black people. The Picayune was more explicit than the Republican in expressing what 
it felt the limits of that equality should be, and was not shy about its belief in white 
supremacy. But the Republican did not have a progressive vision of its own in terms of 
race, and having been in power for eight years, it was difficult for the paper to make a 
case for the Republican Party as an agent of even general improvements in the areas of 
government and economy. On the other hand, even as it explicitly advocated against 
social or economic equality, the Picayune was able to at least position the Democrats as a 
change from the status quo, and employ a “rising tides lift all boats” appeal to black 
voters.  
For the Louisianian, neither of these visions was particularly enticing. Like the 
New Orleans Tribune before, it advocated positions that were based on the notion of 
black elevation and equality and the need for protection from the significant number of 
groups and individuals that wished to do them harm. More so than in the Tribune, 
however, these positions were coupled with a sense of political abandonment by the 
Republican Party and a desire to develop their own political power and independence. It 
appears as if the Louisianian could sense the inevitability of Radical Reconstruction’s 
collapse, and understood that any meaningful gains would not come with the support of 
the Republican Party or the federal government. This made it all the more important that 
a formidable coalition with a political vision for black people be developed 
independently. 
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Both the immediate aftermath of the election, and the decades to follow, would 
unveil both the Republican and the Picayune’s professed positions on race to be 
essentially political veils for their party’s true priorities. The compromise of 1877 and the 
abandonment of Southern blacks by the federal government revealed how limited the 
Republican Party’s commitment to racial equality actually was, and the weariness they 
developed attempting to secure it. The Democrats, after gaining control of the South, 
eventually used their power to go back on their commitments to upholding the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth amendments, and to disenfranchise and subjugate the blacks in Louisiana in 
varying degrees for nearly a century. As for the Louisianian, their foreboding sense of 
abandonment was justified. Also justified was the notion that only a unified and forceful 
movement of and for black people would be the means to secure the more dignified, 
secure, and prosperous future that they envisioned for the freedmen. Unfortunately it 
would only be after enduring decades of segregation, political and economic subjugation, 
and violence that such a movement would come to pass. 
  
     
      
 
 
 
 
		 54 
Chapter Four: Conclusion 
On April 28th, 1877, four days after the removal of from the state, the Republican 
reflected on what Reconstruction had meant for Louisiana. Their assessment was notably 
hopeful: 
Great changes have came over our State, not the least of which is that manifested 
in the political sentiments of our people, or rather the more noisy and self-
asserting portion of our white citizens. The blacks then were not people, they 
were chattels….Now those chattels are citizens coveted for their votes by their 
former masters. Those masters who then despised, as only the haughty can 
despise, the word “Republican,” are now, in everything but name, Republicans of 
the first water, recognizing the negro as an integral part of the body politic, 
entitled to any office he may be fit for, and— wonder of wonders—willing that 
negro children should receive the same educational advantages as white ones. 
Verily, the world does go on, and carries even Southern Democrats along with it. 
 
Despite their warnings of Democratic racial intolerance and hostility during the 1876 
campaign, the Republican had come to understand that by that time there was no real 
substantive difference between the Democratic position on race and their own. They 
point to the softening of Southern Democrats towards the idea of black suffrage and 
equality as the reason. But looking at how the Picayune and the Republican shifted or 
failed to shift their racial positions, and how they discussed matters of equality, suggests 
a deeper similarity in how they understood race more generally. For both of those papers 
racial equality was primarily a political consideration that could be either celebrated or 
cautioned against depending on circumstance, and was not tied to fundamental American 
values or deep moral imperatives. For the black papers, however, despite a shift in their 
rhetorical focus between 1868 and 1876, their advocacy for racial equality was always 
tied to a sense of American idealism and moral necessity. 
Of the papers examined here, the Daily Picayune changed its rhetoric most 
significantly regarding race between the 1868 and 1876 elections. In 1868, any 
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suggestion of political equality among the races was seen as an act of aggression 
against whites, blacks were portrayed as violent and ignorant, and carpetbaggers as 
unprincipled opportunists. Race, and the looming threat of black supremacy, was an 
essential element in its coverage. While there were attempts to reach out to black voters, 
they primarily consisted of trying to convince them that the restriction of their own 
political and civil rights would be to their benefit. That benefit, however, was not an 
improvement their political, social, or economic position-- rather it was degree of safety, 
gained through appeasement of the more extreme elements of the Democratic Party that 
would do them physical harm. Perhaps most significantly, in its 1868 coverage, 
the Picayune promised that the result of Radical Reconstruction would be prolonged and 
inevitable violence. 
There were elements of the Picayune’s coverage in 1876 that remained the same 
as in 1868. It retained a belief in white supremacy, and regarded the relationship between 
former slaves and slave owners as generally harmonious. But by 1876, 
the Picayune’s coverage was significantly less inclined to use the threat of racial equality, 
or black supremacy, as a means of appealing to white voters than it was in 1868.  It 
ceased the daily reports of violence in which blacks were inevitably portrayed as the 
aggressors. There was a suggestion that blacks would share in the economic prosperity 
that would come with a Democratic administration, and that they would be allowed to 
maintain their political and civil rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. 
What caused the change in the Picayune’s rhetoric surrounding race? First, it was 
clearly aware of the possibility of the election being taken from the Democrats by the 
Republican Returning Board, and thus was careful not to print anything that could be 
		 56 
taken as encouraging intimidation or violence. In conservative campaigns throughout 
Louisiana, writes Joe Taylor, “White League racism was, at least publicly, forgotten” 
(1974, 486). Instead there was an overtly conciliatory approach extended towards black 
voters. They were invited to be speakers for the Democratic cause, and the number of 
blacks at their rallies was touted as evidence of their bi-racial appeal (Taylor 1974, 486). 
This Democratic Party strategy of simultaneously making an appeal to the black vote, 
while also attempting to conceal the intimidation and coercion that was taking place, was 
evident in the Picayune’s coverage. 
            There is also the possibility, however, that the Picayune had genuinely moderated 
its views on race, which were never as vitriolic as some of their Southern counterparts 
(Osthaus 1994, 68). The shift in Democratic Party platform on the constitutional 
amendments may have been a way to win over Northerners and Southern blacks, but it 
certainly did not indicate any serious shift away from white supremacy. In fact, the 
ascendency of the Democratic Party in the South did not guarantee the eventual 
capitulation to the extreme racism of Jim Crow. In The Strange Career of Jim Crow, C. 
Vann Woodward identifies three racial philosophies “that rejected the doctrines of 
extreme racism” after the end of Reconstruction: liberal, radical, and conservative (2002, 
45). The “liberal philosophy” maintained the demands for equality that Radical 
Reconstruction had attempted, and was rejected outright. The “radical philosophy” was 
manifested in the Populist Party, but racial fracturing and political failure led to its 
demise near the end of the century and to the institutional segregation of Jim Crow. The 
“conservative philosophy,” however, positioned itself between the extreme racists who 
sought an “aggressive war” on the black population and the supposed self-serving 
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carpetbaggers who displayed not just poor judgment but also a “baseness of motivation.” 
“The conservatives reminded the Negro that he had something to lose as well as 
something to gain,” wrote Woodward, “and that his Northern champions’ exclusive pre-
occupation with gains for the Negro had evoked the danger of losing all he had gained so 
far. The conservative’s primary purpose was to conserve” (2002, 48). 
The conservative approach to race provides a relatively accurate description of 
what the Picayune put forth in both 1868 and 1876, and within this framework their shift 
on race was not so much a change in philosophy as product of circumstance.  In 1868, 
when the notions of black political participation and equal rights was still viewed as 
revolutionary and the ratification of the new state constitution had not yet been finalized, 
the Picayune could not accept them. The relative safety that would result from an 
overthrow of Radical policies was their consolation offer.  After eight years of both the 
normalization of that violence as well as of black political activity, however, the instinct 
changed. The conservative position now allowed the violence to go on without comment, 
but also promised not to drastically curtail the rights of blacks that had already been 
guaranteed by the constitution, despite having considered these freedoms a travesty eight 
years earlier. The change fell well short of any sort of endorsement of black equality. But 
rather than prescribing to the dogmatism of what Woodward termed the “extreme 
racists,” the Picayune expressed an evolving version of what they must have considered a 
more pragmatic vision of white supremacy. 
The Picayune’s evolution contrasts sharply with the Republican’s remarkably 
similar racial rhetoric in both 1868 and 1876. During each election, the Republican made 
an effort to position itself as the political alternative to both the ante-bellum social order 
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of the South and the continued racial violence that plagued Louisiana throughout 
Reconstruction. But in neither election did that position ever grow into a vigorous call for 
the uplift of freedmen or greater equality for the black population beyond the guarantees 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. Instead, it settled into a pattern of self-
satisfied paternalism, focused on reminding its readers of the horrors of the war and the 
virtue and past accomplishments of the Republican Party. 
            What the essential convergence of the Republican and Picayune’s proclaimed 
stances on racial issues in 1876 likely suggests is that their opposition to one another, 
even in 1868, ultimately had little to do with differing convictions on race, but rather a 
distinction in their fears and desire for power. Outweighing their commitment to racial 
equality was the Republican’s fear that former Confederates, who they considered traitors 
to the nation, would return to power. And rather than opposing the extension of political 
or civil rights to blacks as some sort of moral transgression, the Picayune feared that the 
even more Radical elements of the Republican Party would make an actual effort to 
disrupt the social and economic control of the planter elite in Louisiana through 
redistribution of land and other more vigorous attempts at black uplift. 
The New Orleans Tribune and the Weekly Louisianian, despite being two distinct 
institutions, presented views on race at the beginning and end of Reconstruction that 
demonstrated continuity in their focus on improving the conditions for black people in 
Louisiana. However, the methods used by each paper and the issues they stressed 
highlighted the changing attitude of the black population towards the Republican Party. 
In 1868, the rhetoric of the Tribune was primarily concerned with securing black political 
and civil rights, and stressing the ability and agency of the black population to handle 
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those rights, and planting those appeals in the larger context of American and democratic 
ideals.  They were not particularly preoccupied with independent political power or 
scorning the Republican Party. It is important to note, however, that despite it not being 
central to their coverage, in 1868 the Tribune did defect from the Republican Party’s 
nomination of Henry Clay Warmoth for Governor. Roudanez, the paper’s owner, “simply 
refused to support the election of a carpetbagger,” and positioned himself as the leader of 
the “pure Radicals” (Melancon 2003, 61). 
It is telling that the main proprietor of the Louisianian, P.B.S. Pinchback, did 
not defect from the Republican ticket in 1868 (Taylor 1984, 157). But despite his 
previous allegiance, by 1876 the contents of the Louisianian had become outspokenly 
skeptical of the Republican Party’s commitment to the cause of black people—a 
significant indictment of the conduct and rhetoric of the white Republican leadership 
during their time in power. This skepticism translated into a call for unity among 
Louisiana blacks and a desire for a more significant amount of political power either 
within or distinct from the Republican Party. Those positions were advocated by 
the Louisianian more forcefully than they had been by the Tribune, and were particularly 
notable coming from a paper that had, at its inception, wholeheartedly identified itself 
with the Republican Party. But expressing the need for independence was by no means a 
foreign concept to the black population, as Roudanez and the Tribune had demonstrated 
eight years earlier. 
         
The contentions made by each paper in this study about the meaning of 
emancipation, the role of blacks in Southern society, the moral and political calculus of 
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themselves and their opponents, and the ultimate reasons for the failure of Republican 
government in the South were not settled by the withdrawal of federal troops in 1877.  Of 
course, the issue of race in American society has never ceased to be central to political 
discourse, popular culture, or academic scholarship. But by briefly looking at the 
historiography of Reconstruction, it is evident how the more specific claims and 
perspectives of these papers have reverberated in our various understandings of the era. 
The Dunning School, a group of early 20th century historians studying at 
Columbia University under professors William A. Dunning and John A. Burgess, put 
forward the first dominant narrative of Reconstruction.  “In this view,” summarizes Eric 
Foner, “vindictive Radical Republicans fastened black supremacy upon the defeated 
South, unleashing an orgy of corruption presided over by unscrupulous carpetbaggers, 
traitorous scalawags, and ignorant freedmen. Eventually, the white community of the 
South overthrew this misgovernment and restored Home Rule (a euphemism for white 
supremacy)” (1986, 82).  A number of scholars have noted the ways in which the 
Dunning School’s interpretation of Reconstruction was essentially the version of the 
period presented by Southern propagandists, and the one accepted by the regional white 
population (Smith and Lowery 2013, 7). But even the specific language used to discredit 
the mission of Reconstruction at the time was utilized by subsequent historians, so even 
now it is impossible to extinguish their influence. Ted Tunnell demonstrates how 
Southern editors in particular intentionally invented the term “carpetbagger” during the 
state conventions of 1867 in order to discredit whole host of Northern players in the 
South and to agitate the Southern sense of persecution from outside forces. In 
the Picayune, that term and its surrounding implications were a mainstay of its coverage 
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of both the 1868 and 1876 elections and was essential in its attempts to undermine the 
moral high ground of the Northern attempts at racial equality— the “ideological raison 
d’être of Radical Reconstruction” (Tunnell 2006, 821). But “carpetbagger” and its 
symbolic weight integrated itself into the Dunning narrative of Reconstruction and 
beyond. Bernard Weisberger notes the absurdity of the fact that in school textbooks 
pejoratives such as “‘carpetbagger’ or ‘scalawag’ are sometimes used as if they were 
genuine proper nouns and not cartoonstists' labels.” He goes on: “It is true that they are 
now so familiar as perhaps not to need quotation marks, and yet by the same token we 
should expect to find Jacobin, Doughface, and Gold Bug in current and unqualified usage 
to describe certain groups in our history” (Weisberger 1959, 435). And indeed, historians 
writing over a hundred years later and with dramatically different perspectives find 
themselves nonetheless subservient to the terms of conversation first put forth by the 
Picayune and other Southern papers. Regarding his use of “carpetbagger” and 
“scalawag,” Eric Foner writes that the terms “have become so unavoidable a part of the 
lexicon of Reconstruction that I have continued to employ without intending to accept 
their pejorative implications” (Foner 2014, 295). 
The Picayune also, in its pivot away from the overt rhetoric of racial prejudice 
between 1868 and 1876, anticipated the attempts of the Dunning School to frame the 
opposition to Radical Reconstruction in more palatable terms. This is not to say that 
the Picayune in 1876 nor the historians of the Dunning School denied the claim of white 
racial superiority, but rather positioned that claim and the assumed inferiority of black 
people as incidental to their  desire for better government overall, as opposed to the 
primary purpose. “White historians,” wrote Weisberger in 1959, “have shied away from 
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grasping the nettle of the race conflict, mainly because of the difficulty of recognizing 
their own emotional involvement with the problem” (436).  This difficulty led historians 
to ignore evidence that would suggest a more visceral initial reaction of the South to 
integrated politics. “A glance at source materials of the sixties,” Weisberger suggested, 
“shows that many so-called conservatives opposed the Radical program for the South not 
because they were devoted to states' rights, or agrarianism, or the Constitution, or the 
Democratic Party alone, but plainly and simply because they thought it was sinful to give 
so-called Africans the right to share in governments framed by a clearly superior Anglo-
Saxon race” (1959, 437). This comes to light almost immediately when looking at issues 
of the Picayune in 1868, but it is a fact that both the Picayune and the Dunning School in 
their own ways attempted to dampen. 
W.E.B. DuBois, widely credited with issuing the first sweeping critique of the 
Dunning narrative, laid out in the very first page of Black Reconstruction the fundamental 
difference in his approach from previous historians: “I am going to tell this story as 
though Negroes were ordinary human beings,” wrote DuBois, “realizing that this attitude 
will from the first seriously curtail my audience” (1935). He was right. His work was 
largely ignored until the Civil Rights Movement. But his basic premise, that the freedmen 
were fundamental actors in Reconstruction, with agency and capability, was not new. It 
was recognized and made a central theme by both black-owned papers examined in this 
study. The New Orleans Tribune in 1868 both demanded acknowledgment for black 
humanity and demonstrated their ideological independence and the Louisianian, sensing 
abandonment from the Republican Party and the government, amplified the call for black 
political cohesion and power. 
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Another related strain of scholarly concern that was evident in the Tribune and 
the Louisianian was the “Americanization” of the black population during 
Reconstruction. Francis Simkins, in 1939, wrote that the “loose assertions concerning 
Reconstruction as an attempt to return the ideals of the jungle, as an effort to re-barbarize 
the Negro and to make South Carolina and Mississippi into African provinces, seems to 
have no basis in the truth” (58). He goes on to enumerate the ways in which blacks 
attempted to imitate the white population with respect to education, culture, religion, and 
even in their political corruption. Simkins rejects the “numerous writers” before him who 
cast aspersions on the attempts of freedmen to emulate white culture. Their efforts, he 
argued, to “attain the standards of American civilization….is a tribute to the sound 
instincts of these blacks and their Reconstruction mentors” (60). 
One finds an element of truth in this characterization when looking at Louisiana’s 
black papers. “Is not America the land of our birth?” asked the Tribune. “Are we not as 
much American as other of the same nativity? Are we not by birth and by the supreme 
statutes of the nation American citizens? Then let us drop the term African” (December 
19, 1868) And they certainly desired education and access to the political arena, and in 
making their case often invoked American political ideals. Eric Foner suggests that black 
leaders during Reconstruction “can best be understood as those most capable of 
appropriating the available political language of American society and forging from it an 
expression of the aspirations of the freedmen” (1982, 90). 
But in terms of the broader political stance of each of these papers, both Simkins 
and Foner miss a key point. Rather than displaying a blanket reverence for all things 
American and fighting for access for the freedmen, the Tribune’s petitions for integration 
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contained an inherent, and loaded, critique— they pointed to the chasm between 
purported American ideals and the reality of American society. The same is true of 
the Louisianian’s petition for protection from violence by white terrorist organizations 
issued eight years later.  In the eyes of these papers, the fulfillment of political and civil 
rights and protections for freedmen were not only a matter of them attaining the status 
American citizenship, but of the white population of Louisiana and the nation at large 
living up to fundamental American principles. “And can you expect that four millions of 
American citizens, of African descent though they be, will tamely submit to be governed 
by laws which they have no hand in framing?” asked the Tribune in 1867. “Is it 
Democratic in you to desire it? You call yourselves Democrats; we are Democrats in the 
legitimate sense. We advocate a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people” (April 23, 1868). The Tribune and the Louisianian, in the tradition of the black 
papers before them, were advocating not just for the “Americanization” of black people, 
but the “Americanization” of America. 
It is telling that it is difficult to find a historical version of Reconstruction that has 
taken on as its guiding light something resembling the Republican’s interpretation of the 
period in the way the Dunning School did with the Picayune, or DuBois and the 
revisionists did with the Tribune and the Louisianian. The inability or unwillingness of 
the Republican to express coherent vision on the most essential Reconstruction question 
also makes it unsurprising. Lawanda and John T. Cox, looking at how historians have 
evaluated the Republican decision to pass legislation for universal male suffrage, note 
that “whether historians have condemned or applauded the grant of suffrage to Negroes 
in the post-Civil War years, they have more often than not viewed the motives behind this 
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party action with considerable cynicism” (1967, 303). The study goes on to suggest that 
in fact historians have actually not done a particularly thorough job in examining 
the evidence of Republican motives, such as whether those who voted for the Fourteenth 
amendment were “acting in a manner consistent with their past public records,” or had 
“demonstrated a concern for the well-being of free Negroes or a willingness publicly to 
support the unpopular cause of Negro suffrage” (1967, 329). These criteria make sense 
when looking at an individual politician. A newspaper affiliated with a political party, 
however, is charged with providing information and also interpreting that information 
based on a set of ideals and principles. One might judge the “motives” of that paper, then, 
based on the comprehensiveness of their interpretation and the consistency of their 
values. While the Republican defended black political and civil rights and condemned 
white terrorism, they refused to focus on the principles of racial equality, endorse 
integration, or perhaps most importantly, provide their own vision for what race 
relations should look like in a reconstructed Louisiana. These discrepancies might be 
taken as enough evidence to account for at least a degree of, if not “considerable,” 
cynicism regarding their motives. 
 
Just as the debates over the meaning of Reconstruction have continued in 
historical  scholarship, the fundamental issues that these papers were debating at the time 
have not disappeared from our political and cultural debates. What is the meaning of 
racial equality? Does it go beyond civil and political equality under the law? Are those 
things contingent on some degree of economic stability? Does the federal government 
have the right to intervene when individual states fail to abide by protections put forth in 
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the Constitution? Who should have the right to vote, and what measures must be put into 
place so certain populations are not prevented or discouraged from doing so? What is the 
right way to proceed politically on these issues? Is it better to advocate for gradual 
change, or to make hardline demands based on moral principles, even in the face of broad 
and virulent opposition? Nearly any current political issue concerning racial equality can 
be traced back to the period in which former slaves were first negotiating their position as 
citizens: affirmative action, employment and housing discrimination, segregation in 
communities and schools, voting rights, and mass incarceration, to name a few. They are 
issues that newspapers, and the press at large, continue to struggle with today. 
Considering these papers side by side, as products of individuals living and 
working in the same city at the same time, contending with the same overwhelming 
circumstances, contrasts both their ideological positions as well as the limits and 
expanses of their political imagination. The Picayune, particularly in 1868, demonstrates 
the almost unimaginable fear and anger that must have engulfed white Southerners as 
their former property suddenly transformed into half of the voting electorate—a situation 
that makes current discussions of demographic change and accompanying white anxiety 
pale in comparison. The hope and subsequent frustration expressed in 
the Tribune and Louisianian are emblematic of the always wrought and never linear 
relationship between struggle and progress that has defined the black experience in 
America.  And if the Republican’s conduct throughout Reconstruction is the most easily 
assailable of all the papers, by demonstrating the way attempts at moral and principled 
advancement can be undermined by questions of practicality, desire for power, and 
internalized prejudice, it is also perhaps the most easily recognizable. Ultimately, this 
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study finds that the neither of the white-owned papers understood the project of 
Reconstruction as part of a broader struggle for racial egalitarianism in the United States. 
The black-owned papers did, and by establishing their position as elemental to American 
values they carried the tradition of the black press that had been struggling for racial 
equality since long before emancipation. 
“Old methods have failed utterly…yet we must accept the situation and 
accommodate ourselves to the new condition of things,” reads a letter published in the 
Louisianian in 1877, following the removal of federal troops. “Our duty now is to 
comprehend fully our condition and prospects, and set our house in order for the future” 
(November 10). Though perhaps unconsciously, while engaged in the immediate political 
contentiousness of Reconstruction, these papers were also simultaneously setting their 
“house in order for the future” by defining the terms of debate that future historians, 
politicians, and citizens would use as they struggled with the meaning of Reconstruction. 
Those terms are vitally important, and the conclusions that America draws about 
Reconstruction, as evidenced by Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement, and the 
continued struggle for racial justice and equality in America, are indicative of their 
power.  
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